Memory systems and the control of skilled action

Christensen, Wayne; Sutton, John; Bicknell, Kath

doi:10.1080/09515089.2019.1607279

Cited by 29 publications

(30 citation statements)

References 70 publications

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“…It is important to consider the degree of change involved in generating the new movement solution because this directly ties into how the flexibility is generated – either through explicit “strategy-like” behavior ( Taylor and Ivry, 2011 ; Christensen and Bicknell, 2019 ; Christensen et al, 2019 ) or through implicit “synergy-like” behavior. Strategic changes are likely associated with cognitive skills, such as anticipation and decision-making, and involve relatively large modifications to the movement patterns that could be employed in contexts, where there is a distinct change in the environment (e.g., adjusting to different surfaces in tennis).…”

Section: Challenge 1: Characterizing Behavioral Flexibilitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Repetition Without Repetition: Challenges in Understanding Behavioral Flexibility in Motor Skill

2020

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A hallmark of skilled motor performance is behavioral flexibility-i.e., experts can not only produce a movement pattern to reliably and efficiently achieve a given task outcome, but also possess the ability to change that movement pattern to fit a new context. In this perspective article, we briefly highlight the factors that are critical to understanding behavioral flexibility, and its connection to movement variability, stability, and learning. We then address how practice strategies should be developed from a motor learning standpoint to enhance behavioral flexibility. Finally, we highlight some important future avenues of work that are needed to advance our understanding of behavioral flexibility. We use examples from sport as a context to highlight these issues, especially in regard to elite performance and development.

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Section: Challenge 1: Characterizing Behavioral Flexibilitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Repetition Without Repetition: Challenges in Understanding Behavioral Flexibility in Motor Skill

2020

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“…2 See e.g., Pavese (2013Pavese ( , 2018Pavese ( , 2020a. For the role of propositional knowledge in skillful action, see also Stanley & Krakauer ( 2013 ), Christensen et al (2019), and see Wu, Chapter 16 in this volume. 3 Not everybody thinks of perception in terms of tracking.…”

Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Practical Representation*

Pavese¹

2020

The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Skill and Expertise

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We know facts in a variety of ways. For example, one may know a fact perceptually or by mere testimony. Compare an instance of perceptual knowledge-e.g., the knowledge that one acquires when one sees that there is a table in front of oneself-to an instance of non-perceptual knowledge with the same content-e.g., the knowledge that one acquires by mere testimony when one is told that there is a table in front of one. It is natural to distinguish between these two types of knowledge in terms of the modes of presentation under which they represent the state of aff airs that there is a table in front of one. In the former case (when one sees the table), one knows that there is a table in front of oneself under a visual mode of presentation, whereas in the latter case (when one is merely told that there is a table), one comes to know that proposition under a non-visual mode of presentation. According to a prominent view of know-how-known as intellectualism about know-howknowing how to perform a task is a matter of being in a propositional knowledge state about how to perform the task under a distinctive mode of presentation. The relevant mode of presentation is neither testimonial nor merely perceptual. Rather, it is distinctively practical. Knowing how to perform a task, and being skilled at performing a task, such as swimming, is a matter of knowing facts about how to perform a task under a practical representation of that task. As I understand it, the view is motivated by a variety of considerations coming from action theory and cognitive sciences that strongly suggest that the intentionality and intelligence of our actions is to be explained in terms of propositional knowledge about the means to achieve certain goals. 2 This chapter will not rehearse those motivations here. Rather, it will focus on the question: what does it mean to represent a task under a practical mode of presentation? The chief challenge for proponents of intellectualism is to spell out in clear and independently motivated terms what it means to represent something practically. This chapter discusses recent attempts to clarify the notion of practical representation and its theoretical fruitfulness. The ultimate goal is not just to show that intellectualists are on good grounds when they appeal to practical representation in their theories of know-how. Rather, it is to argue that any plausible theory of skill and know-how has to appeal to the notion of practical representation developed here. Section 18.1 explains the notion of a mode of presentation and introduces practical modes of presentation. Section 18.2 illustrates practical representation by discussing models of motor 02_9781138744776c07-c39_p100-516.indd 226 02_9781138744776c07-c39_p100-516.indd 226 07-Jul-20 5:30:17 PM 07-Jul-20 5:30:17 PM 18.1 What is a mode of presentation? We are accustomed to the idea that the same individual might be represented under diff erent conceptual modes of presentation. For example, one might think of Venus as the morning star ; one might think of Venus a...

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“…Questions have also been raised about the experimental evidence for skill automaticity. Christensen et al (, ) raise doubts about the ecological validity or realism of the experimental conditions, focusing in particular on the fact that they typically employ tasks that are easy for the experts. This might explain why Beilock and Carr () found reduced awareness in experts since the task (involving 70 putts on carpet) may have been boring, resulting in the experts giving little attention to performance.…”

Section: Skill and Automaticitymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…According to Christensen et al's (); Christensen, Sutton, and Bicknell's () Mesh theory, most skill domains are simply too large for the generally slow processes of implicit learning to acquire solutions for the bulk of the problems that skilled individuals must cope with. In other words, for most skills, normal performance typically involves sufficient novelty that at least some cognitive control is required.…”

Section: Skill and Cognitive Controlmentioning

confidence: 99%