Practical Representation*

Abstract

We know facts in a variety of ways. For example, one may know a fact perceptually or by mere testimony. Compare an instance of perceptual knowledge-e.g., the knowledge that one acquires when one sees that there is a table in front of oneself-to an instance of non-perceptual knowledge with the same content-e.g., the knowledge that one acquires by mere testimony when one is told that there is a table in front of one. It is natural to distinguish between these two types of knowledge in terms of the modes of presentation under which they represent the state of aff airs that there is a table in front of one. In the former case (when one sees the table), one knows that there is a table in front of oneself under a visual mode of presentation, whereas in the latter case (when one is merely told that there is a table), one comes to know that proposition under a non-visual mode of presentation. According to a prominent view of know-how-known as intellectualism about know-howknowing how to perform a task is a matter of being in a propositional knowledge state about how to perform the task under a distinctive mode of presentation. The relevant mode of presentation is neither testimonial nor merely perceptual. Rather, it is distinctively practical. Knowing how to perform a task, and being skilled at performing a task, such as swimming, is a matter of knowing facts about how to perform a task under a practical representation of that task. As I understand it, the view is motivated by a variety of considerations coming from action theory and cognitive sciences that strongly suggest that the intentionality and intelligence of our actions is to be explained in terms of propositional knowledge about the means to achieve certain goals. 2 This chapter will not rehearse those motivations here. Rather, it will focus on the question: what does it mean to represent a task under a practical mode of presentation? The chief challenge for proponents of intellectualism is to spell out in clear and independently motivated terms what it means to represent something practically. This chapter discusses recent attempts to clarify the notion of practical representation and its theoretical fruitfulness. The ultimate goal is not just to show that intellectualists are on good grounds when they appeal to practical representation in their theories of know-how. Rather, it is to argue that any plausible theory of skill and know-how has to appeal to the notion of practical representation developed here. Section 18.1 explains the notion of a mode of presentation and introduces practical modes of presentation. Section 18.2 illustrates practical representation by discussing models of motor 02_9781138744776c07-c39_p100-516.indd 226 02_9781138744776c07-c39_p100-516.indd 226 07-Jul-20 5:30:17 PM 07-Jul-20 5:30:17 PM 18.1 What is a mode of presentation? We are accustomed to the idea that the same individual might be represented under diff erent conceptual modes of presentation. For example, one might think of Venus as the morning star ; one might think of Venus a...

Practical concepts and productive reasoning

“…6 I myself believe that there are good reasons for positing this sort of subpersonal representation (cf. [Pavese, 2017b], [Pavese, 2019]; [Pavese, 2020]) but I do not want my argument for practical concepts to depend on there being subpersonal motor representations.…”

“…For example, motor representations such as motor commands and subpersonal motor schemas are combinatorial representations but they are not conceptual ( [Pavese, 2019], [Pavese, 2020]) in that they are not supposed to figure in reasoning. 13 And perceptual representations might be combinatorial and compositional ( [Lande, 2018], [Lande, 2020]) but they do not qualify as conceptual for the same reason.…”

The Role of Information in Knowledge-How

“…A central strategy adopted by intellectualists to explain the fine-grained nature of the informational states guiding skillful actions is to appeal to practical representations ( Pavese, 2017 , 2019 , 2020 ). Practical representations allow for propositional content to be sufficiently rich in detail to capture this fine-grained information.…”