“Memory, Natural Kinds, and Cognitive Extension; or, Martians Don’t Remember, and Cognitive Science Is Not about Cognition”

Abstract

Your article is protected by copyright and all rights are held exclusively by Springer Science +Business Media Dordrecht. This e-offprint is for personal use only and shall not be selfarchived in electronic repositories. If you wish to self-archive your work, please use the accepted author's version for posting to your own website or your institution's repository. You may further deposit the accepted author's version on a funder's repository at a funder's request, provided it is not made publicly available until 12 months after publication.

Cognition and behavior

“…Sect. 3 of Rupert (2013), however, makes the case that these conditions are not supposed to be interpreted as operationalism:…”

“…Rupert, who is by no means an advocate of embodied, enactive, or extended cognition, however, also appears to embrace this sort of picture. In Rupert (2013), we find the claim that According to the systems-based view, a state (or process) is cognitive (if and?) only if it is the state of a (non-background) mechanism (or is a process made up wholly of causally connected states of various such mechanisms) that is a component of a persisting architecture-that is, a member of the relatively persisting set of mechanisms that co-contribute (although not necessarily by interacting), in various intersecting subsets, to the production of a variety of forms of intelligent behavior (that are part of a single biography).…”

The philosophy of memory technologies: Metaphysics, knowledge, and values

“…Some philosophers go further and have argued that the external artifact is not just defined in relation to the human memory system, but can literally be part of an extended (Clark & Chalmers 1998;Rowlands 1999;Clark 2003Clark , 2008Menary 2007;Sutton 2010) or distributed memory system (Hutchins 1995;Michaelian & Sutton 2013), whereas others have denied this (Adams & Aizawa 2001;Rupert 2013). A key example in the extended mind debate is Clark & Chalmers' case of 'Otto' and his notebook.…”

Identifying and individuating cognitive systems: a task-based distributed cognition alternative to agent-based extended cognition

“…One of their key arguments (we will not consider their discussion of the ''mark of the cognitive'') points to apparent functional differences between internal and external resources (cf. Rupert 2004Rupert , 2013. Consider, for example, Donald's (1993) discussion of exograms or external memory traces (so-called by analogy with engrams, i.e., internal memory traces).…”