Mediation: incomplete information bargaining with filtered communication

Jarque, Xavier; Ponsatı́, Clara; Sákovics, József

doi:10.1016/s0304-4068(03)00048-x

Cited by 40 publications

(13 citation statements)

References 27 publications

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“…An issue which is closely related is the extent to which a stakeholder might be able to choose whether or not to intervene in negotiations. 7 Finally, a more realistic approach would be to consider the effects of uncertainty on the part of the bargainers over the exact amount of resources available to the stakeholder. We leave these issues to be addressed properly in future research.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Stakeholder bargaining games

Manzini

Ponsatı́

2006

Int J Game Theory

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We study bilateral bargaining problems with an interested third party, the stakeholder, that enjoys benefits upon a bilateral agreement. To address the strategic implications of stakeholders over negotiations, we consider a model where two bargainers interact in the presence of a third party that (a) can transfer a share of her benefits to the bargainers but cannot receive a share of the bilateral surplus, and (b) while she may not participate in all periods of the negotiation, she cannot remain entirely inhibited. Our main findings are (1) that the stakeholder's (reverse) liquidity constraint implies the existence of a multiplicity of stationary subgame perfect equilibria that include outcomes with very asymmetric bilateral agreements, and (2) that the partial participation of the stakeholder may be the source of severe inefficiency.JEL classification: C78.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The assumption that stakeholders enjoy a positive externality distinguishes our model from models of bargaining with arbitration or mediation, in which a third party (the mediator) derives no utility from an agreement (e.g. [3], [7] and [9]). Externalities are a main concern in the recent literature on coalition formation (see [1], [4], [6], [8], [12], [17]).…”

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confidence: 99%

Stakeholder bargaining games

Manzini

Ponsatı́

2006

Int J Game Theory

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“…On the one hand, the approach followed by Compte and Jehiel (1995) and Manzini and Mariotti (2001), analyzes the role of arbitrators as pre-fixed outside options of the bargaining process. On the other hand, Jarque, et al (2003) and Copic and Ponsatí (2003) study mediators as information filters in a context of two-sided asymmetric information. In these cases, the role of the mediators is to make the agreement public as soon as the parties have made mutually acceptable offers.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The role of mediation in peacemaking and peacekeeping negotiations

Camiña

Porteiro

2009

European Economic Review

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JEL Classification numbers: C72, C78. AbstractWe develop a model of bargaining that provides a rationale for the difference in the method of negotiation, depending on the nature of the conflict. We distinguish those negotiations that take place previous to a potential conflict (peacekeeping), and negotiations inside the conflict (peacemaking). In these contexts, we study the role of a mediator that tries to achieve a certain balance between the efficiency of the agreement and the equality of the sharing. We show that the credibility of the mediator comes from her willingness to impose delays in the negotiation, even if that implies costs. We also find how the "weak" player in the conflict can strategically profit from the mediator's quest for equality. Finally, we show how the capacity of the mediator to induce a higher equality in the sharing is always higher in a peacemaking situation than in a peacekeeping one.

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“…Compte and Jehiel (1995) and Manzini and Mariotti (2001) emphasize the role of arbitrators as the outside option of a bilateral bargaining game. Jarque, Ponsatí, and Sákovics (2003) andČopič and Ponsatí (2003) consider a model where the mediator is an information filter in a context of bilateral bargaining under two-sided asymmetric information. In all these models, third parties are only part of the environment in which bargaining takes place, they do not receive payoffs nor do they take any strategic decision.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Economic Diplomacy

Ponsatı́

2004

J Public Economic Theory

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We study bilateral conflicts that affect the welfare of third parties, the stakeholders. The conflict takes the form of a war of attrition and intervention is modeled as the possibility that the stakeholder "aids" the agreement with transfers to the contenders. We characterize the optimal policy when the stakeholder limits its intervention to a unilateral commitment to compensate the contenders if the conflict is resolved, and show that if contenders must be treated equally after agreement, then the optimal policy cannot eliminate the delay in resolving the conflict, and intervention is only advisable when the stakes are high enough. Economic diplomacy is modeled as a three-player game where the stakeholder is actively involved in the negotiation where transfers are discussed simultaneously with a settlement for the conflict. We prove that, provided that none of the parties involved is too impatient, diplomacy benefits the third party in all conflicts.

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Mediation: incomplete information bargaining with filtered communication

Cited by 40 publications

References 27 publications

Stakeholder bargaining games

Stakeholder bargaining games

The role of mediation in peacemaking and peacekeeping negotiations

Economic Diplomacy

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