Economic Diplomacy

Ponsatı́, Clara

doi:10.1111/j.1467-9779.2004.00186.x

Cited by 9 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 10 publications

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“…227-228) and they do not consider the possibility of making transfers that may stop war. Ponsatí (2004) studies bilateral conflicts that affect the welfare of a third party. The conflict takes the form of a war of attrition, and intervention is modeled as the possibility that the stakeholder aids the agreement with transfers to the contenders.…”

Section: Relationship With the Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Peace agreements without commitment

Beviá

Corchón

2010

Games and Economic Behavior

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JEL classification: C72 D74In this paper we present a model of war between two rational and completely informed players. We show that in the absence of binding agreements war can be avoided in many cases by one player transferring money to the other player. In most cases, the "rich" country transfers part of its money to the "poor" country. But when the military proficiency of the "rich" country is sufficiently high the "poor" country stops the war by transferring part of its resources to the "rich" country. War cannot be avoided by transfers when inequality of resources is very large or the cost of war is sufficiently low.

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Section: Relationship With the Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Peace agreements without commitment

Beviá

Corchón

2010

Games and Economic Behavior

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Stakeholder bargaining games

Manzini

Ponsatı́

2006

Int J Game Theory

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We study bilateral bargaining problems with an interested third party, the stakeholder, that enjoys benefits upon a bilateral agreement. To address the strategic implications of stakeholders over negotiations, we consider a model where two bargainers interact in the presence of a third party that (a) can transfer a share of her benefits to the bargainers but cannot receive a share of the bilateral surplus, and (b) while she may not participate in all periods of the negotiation, she cannot remain entirely inhibited. Our main findings are (1) that the stakeholder's (reverse) liquidity constraint implies the existence of a multiplicity of stationary subgame perfect equilibria that include outcomes with very asymmetric bilateral agreements, and (2) that the partial participation of the stakeholder may be the source of severe inefficiency.JEL classification: C78.

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Bargaining over a climate deal: deadline and delay

Tazdaït

2011

Ann Oper Res

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International audienceAssuming that a North-South transfer is the key to effective climate cooperation, we ask when and how much the North should offer to the South in return for a commitment to reduce deforestation and forest degradation. In light of the risk of irreversible damage over time, we examine a negotiation with a deadline. In this case, the North threatens the South over a negotiation dead-end in case an agreement is not reached rapidly. We assess the conditions for an agreement to be immediate or delayed, and discuss those situations likely to result in negotiation failure. Despite the risk of irreversible damage over time, we show that cooperation is likely to be delayed and we identify situations wherein the North and South do not reach an agreement within the deadline. Although Pareto-improving, cooperation may collapse because of inefficiencies related to incomplete information. What’s more, we show that in negotiations with a deadline, uncertainty about the benefits deriving from cooperation and the irreversibility of the damage that will be caused if cooperation isdelayed are the two key components affecting choice

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Economic Diplomacy

Cited by 9 publications

References 10 publications

Peace agreements without commitment

Peace agreements without commitment

Stakeholder bargaining games

Bargaining over a climate deal: deadline and delay

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