Mechanism design for land acquisition

Sarkar, Soumendu

doi:10.1007/s00182-016-0556-4

Cited by 12 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 22 publications

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“…In the context of this model, Sarkar (2017) proves an impossibility result (Theorem 1(B) in the paper), which says that the conjunction of incentive compatibility, individual rationality, budget balance, and ex post efficiency is impossible to achieve. Chaturvedi (2023) studies the deficit cost of supporting efficiency via market mechanisms.…”

Section: Modelmentioning

confidence: 95%

“…Buchanan & Yoon, 2000) with the more widely known tragedy of the commons; the former resulting from fragmented property rights while the latter stemming from no property rights. Various impossibility results from Mailath and Postlewaite (1990), Sarkar (2017), Grossman et al (2019), and Chaturvedi (2023) generally indicate that the holdout problem leads to inefficiently low volumes of trade in a large class of market mechanisms that require voluntary trade.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Double auction for trading perfect complements

Chaturvedi,

Pandey

2023

J Public Economic Theory

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For a trading problem where a buyer is interested in an aggregate resource with fragmented ownership, the individually owned resources are perfect complements in trade. A double auction, chosen in accordance with a value alignment principle which we formulate, is shown to be strategy proof for owners. Since it also values the aggregate resource correctly, it mitigates the holdout problem by changing the source of inefficiency from complementarity on owners' side to lack of competition on buyer side. The value alignment principle implies that this double auction has a majority trading rule. With multiple buyers, a suitable modification makes the double auction strategy proof even for the buyers, thus mitigating the holdout problem by achieving approximate ex post efficiency when the number of owners is large.

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Section: Modelmentioning

confidence: 95%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Double auction for trading perfect complements

Chaturvedi,

Pandey

2023

J Public Economic Theory

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“…The topic 'real estate' is by and large absent in the writings of economists including those who are prolific writers on Indian economy. Though some economists have carried out excellent work on land acquisition in rural (and sometimes in urban) areas, they have hardly linked it to PR and the related dead-weight loss in the real estate sector in urban India (see, e.g., Gangopadhyay, 2012;Ghatak & Ghosh, 2011;Ghatak & Mookherjee, 2011;Sarkar, 2016). Real estate is hardly a 'hot' topic of research in universities and think tanks in India.…”

Section: Background On Permit Rajmentioning

confidence: 99%

Land Price, Bubbles and Permit Raj

Singh

2016

Review of Market Integration

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Even where adequate land is available for urban development, there can be high persistent land prices and high-rise buildings. Why? Are high prices always related to bubbles? This article examines these questions. It reconsiders whether high rural land price causes high urban land price or it is the other way round. It is shown that the root cause can lie elsewhere in the Permit Raj in the real estate sector. Dismantling this can make housing more affordable, and increase the economic surplus, potentially providing more room for welfare schemes including those related to land and housing.

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“…See Sen (2007) for a survey. Two recent different approaches in this direction are proposed by Valencia-Toledo and Vidal-Puga (2017) and Sarkar (2017).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A sequential bargaining protocol for land rental arrangements

Valencia-Toledo

Vidal-Puga

2020

Rev Econ Design

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We consider land rental between a single tenant and several lessors.The tenant should negotiate sequentially with each lessor for the available land. In each stage, we apply the Nash bargaining solution. Our results imply that, when all land is necessary, a fixed price per unit is more favourable for the tenant than a lessor-dependent price. Furthermore, a lessor is better off with a lessor-dependent price only when negotiating first. For the tenant, lessors' merging is relevant with lessor-dependent price but not with fixed price.

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Mechanism design for land acquisition

Cited by 12 publications

References 22 publications

Double auction for trading perfect complements

Double auction for trading perfect complements

Land Price, Bubbles and Permit Raj

A sequential bargaining protocol for land rental arrangements

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