No abstract

We associate an optimistic T U game with each minimum cost spanning tree problem. We define the worth of a coalition S as the cost of connecting agents in S to the source assuming that agents in N \S are already connected to the source, and agents in S can connect through agents in N \S. We study the Shapley value of this new game.

We characterize a rule in minimum cost spanning tree problems using an additivity property and some basic properties. If the set of possible agents has at least three agents, these basic properties are symmetry and separability. If the set of possible agents has two agents, we must add positivity.JEL Codes: C71, D70, D85.

No abstract

We present an implementation of the Owen value (Owen, 1977), inspired by the bidding mechanism introduced by Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2001). The idea is the following: first players of each coalition play the bidding mechanism trying to obtain the resources of the coalition. Later, players who obtained the resources play the bidding mechanism in order to share the surplus.