Measuring International Engagement: Systemic and Domestic Factors in Brazilian Foreign Policy from 1998 to 2014

Rodrigues, Pietro; Urdínez, Francisco; Oliveira, Amâncio Jorge Silva Nunes de

doi:10.1093/fpa/orz010

Cited by 13 publications

(10 citation statements)

References 65 publications

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“…He defines three conditions in which change is expected: in states that are not strongly bureaucratized and are authoritarian (which is not the case of Brazil); when the chosen policy fails repeatedly, leading to a reassessment by the policymaker; or when the risk of losses is latent and change is perceived as a means of avoiding it. Rodrigues, Urdinez, and Oliveira (2019) propose an alternative model of measuring the different actions and dimensions of Brazilian foreign policy within a recent approach which accommodates qualitative and quantitative models ______________________________________________________________________________________________ 4 See the article by Silva (2019).…”

Section: Change In Foreign Policymentioning

confidence: 99%

The democratic regime and the changes in Brazilian foreign policy towards South America

Saraiva

2020

Bras. political sci. rev.

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In recent times the interaction between democracy and foreign policy has begun to be studied and theorized in Brazil. The link between politics and foreign policy is not new, however, the focus of this article is on the shifts that have taken place since t he beginning of the democratic regime. Its aim is to identify changes in Brazilian foreign policy based on ideas and political preferences due to alternation of governments; and deconstruct the idea that Brazilian foreign policy is a state policy, limited to superficial changes. Following a discussion of the recent literature about changes in foreign policy, the article maps the changes that occurred between 1990 and 2003 and analyses Brazilian foreign policy behavior towards South America during the Worker's Party administrations. Based on a comparative perspective, it examines the changes in Brazilian behavior toward the region during the Temer administration. This was the area where foreign policy experienced strongest transformations. Finally, the article briefly points out the changes that occurred in foreign policy towards South America at the beginning of Bolsonaro's administration. The methodology, especially in relation to the Temer and Bolsonaro administrations, uses press material and interviews with foreign policymakers.

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Section: Change In Foreign Policymentioning

confidence: 99%

The democratic regime and the changes in Brazilian foreign policy towards South America

Saraiva

2020

Bras. political sci. rev.

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“…Since China’s accession to the WTO, in 2001, bilateral trade has grown exponentially between the two countries (Figure 1a). In less than ten years, China went from Brazil’s 12th major export destination to becoming its main economic partner, both in trade and—more recently—in direct investments and finance (Rodrigues et al, 2019). In 2000, Brazil received 2.3% of its imports and sent 2.0% of its exports to China (by value); in 2010, these numbers had risen to 14.5% and 15.1%, respectively.…”

Section: The Evolution Of Brazil and China Trade Relationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Voter and Legislator Responses to Localized Trade Shocks from China in Brazil

Campello

Urdínez

2020

Comparative Political Studies

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This paper examines whether localized trade shocks from China influence Brazilians’ views on integration with the country. We test the following hypotheses: (1) as trade shocks are localized, views on trade should form at the local, rather than at the individual level, and (2) as localized trade shocks affect both workers and companies in a same region, they should also influence legislators’ views on China. Our analyses find support for both claims, but only among losers from Chinese trade. Residents and legislators from localities hurt by import shocks tend to hold negative views about economic ties with China, whereas neither residents nor legislators from localities benefitted by export shocks exhibit more positive views about the country. Our paper contributes to the literature on the politics of trade by incorporating meso-level theories of trade preference formation and by establishing the conditions under which the interests of constituencies should shape legislators’ views on international trade.

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“…During the 13 years of the Workers' Party government between 2003 and 2016, China was one of Brazil's main foreign policy priorities (Rodrigues et al , 2019). The importance of China as a trading partner is mentioned in the interviews I conducted and in the presidential statements announcing interest in the bank.…”

Section: Assessing the Brazilian And Chilean Interest In Joining The Aiibmentioning

confidence: 99%

The accession of Latin American countries to the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank: lessons from Brazil and Chile

Urdínez

2020

AEDS

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PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to discuss the motivations behind the accession of Latin American countries to the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) with a focus on the cases of Brazil and Chile.Design/methodology/approachThe author collected data using a case study methodology, primarily through semi-structured interviews with decision-makers and through official government documentation.FindingsThe findings identified that, overall, the Brazilian politicians who made the decision to join the bank had an unclear perception of its economic benefit and believed that the clearest benefit from accession is political (to support China's initiative). After years of domestic political turmoil and economic crisis, Brazil experienced delayed incorporation into the bank, slow ratification processes in the domestic arena and a reduction in its capital commitment. Chilean decision-makers, on the other hand, seemed to have a clearer idea of the benefits from accessing the bank, which explains that their ratification process has been faster and smoother. Yet, a surprising socio-political crisis delayed incorporation into the bank. Both countries have delayed their accession to the bank due to domestic crises.Practical implicationsThree policy implications can be drawn from this study. First, the entry of Latin American countries into the bank reflects the persuasiveness of Chinese diplomacy in this region. Second, the author finds that interviewees are not always able to differentiate the AIIB from the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and hold the misguided idea that the AIIB is subordinated to the BRI rather than complementary to it. This might set overly high expectations of the benefits of entering the AIIB. Third, the author foresees that the largest potential of the AIIB in Latin America lies in the possibility of participating in co-financed projects, in particular with the Inter-American Development Bank and the Development Bank of Latin America.Originality/valueResearch on the AIIB has boomed in recent years, yet there are few in-depth studies about Latin American prospective members. The value of this study lies in offering in-depth data for two of the eight prospective members from this region.

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Measuring International Engagement: Systemic and Domestic Factors in Brazilian Foreign Policy from 1998 to 2014

Cited by 13 publications

References 65 publications

The democratic regime and the changes in Brazilian foreign policy towards South America

The democratic regime and the changes in Brazilian foreign policy towards South America

Voter and Legislator Responses to Localized Trade Shocks from China in Brazil

The accession of Latin American countries to the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank: lessons from Brazil and Chile

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