Measuring and explaining noncompliance in federally managed fisheries

Abstract

This article focuses on measuring and explaining noncompliance in federally managed U.S. fisheries. Novel measurement techniques are used to characterize the extent and patterns of noncompliance in the northeast groundfish fishery. According to the authors' estimates, noncompliance increased substantially in 1986 and remained high through 1988 in the groundfish fishery. On Georges Bank during 1987, a quarter to a half of all groundfish vessels were identified as frequent violators, committing closed area violations on about one-third of their trips and using illegal mesh on nearly all trips. Illegal earnings by a typical frequent violator operating in the groundfish fishery on Georges Bank amounted to $225,000 per year in 1987.A theory of compliance in fisheries is developed and applied to explain the trends and patterns of noncompliance in the northeast groundfish fishery. Biological and economic forces are shown to be dominant causes of the recent deterioration in compliance. Other contributing factors include weak sanctions and insufficient enforcement resources. The article concludes with a prognosis for the fishery and recommendations for improving compliance.

Compliance Behaviour in State-Run Fisheries: Situating Lake Chivero in a Policy Perspective

“…Sutinen et al (2000) suggest that non-compliance with regulations is the principle cause of failure of most fishery management and conservation programmes. The argument is that most failure often results from fisheries authorities perceiving non-compliance with regulations equivalent to inadequate enforcement.…”

“…Viswanathan (2004) terms economic factors deterrence factors, and considers them as serving to either increase or decrease the monetary cost or benefits of non-compliance. Enforcement is only but one of the larger management picture as conceptualised by Sutinen et al (2000). The rulemaking bodies, the actual laws and regulations, the players (which include the fishers) in the entire fishing industry, the agencies authourised to prosecute, judge and sanction violators, constitute this total management picture.…”

“…When fishers feel the enforcement of the regulations will generate benefits for them, they tend to comply with the regulations more. Viswanathan (2004) calls them outcome effects of the regulatory institutions while Sutinen et al (2000) observe that fishers tend to feel more obligated to management measures that are credible in terms of conserving the stocks and protecting the future economic health of the fisheries.…”

“…It was generally recognised in legitimacy literature that the fishers" perceived legitimacy of the existing management regulations is an important determinant of their willingness to comply with them Sutinen et al (2000). 84.2% of the respondents indicated that they perceived the regulations to be fair and 15.8% of the respondents felt that they were not.…”

Impact of Enforcement and Co-Management on Compliance Behavior of Fishermen

“…Sutinen, Rieser & Gauvin (1990) used the deterrent theory to conduct an econometric study of regulatory enforcement and compliance in the commercial inshore lobster fishery of Massachusetts in the United States. They set five testable hypotheses, namely: (1) lobstermen who were more income-dependent have a stronger conservation motive and were more likely to comply with conservation and management regulations; (2) lobstermen with more years in the fishery were more likely to perceive and appreciate the long-term benefits of conservation and management measures, and were more likely to comply with regulations; (3) younger lobstermen faced greater financial pressure and were more likely to violate regulations to realize short-term gains; (4) lobstermen with relatives in the fishery had a greater interest in the long-term health of the fishery and were less likely to violate regulations; and (5) frequent violators tended to remain in the fishery for short-term gains only.…”