Measurements of radioxenon in ground level air in South Korea following the claimed nuclear test in North Korea on October 9, 2006

Elevated radioxenon detected remotely following the Fukushima nuclear accident

“…As an example, xenon isotopes were detected following the 2006 underground nuclear test in North Korea (Ringbom et al, 2006), and were the highest activity isotopes emitted following the Three Mile Island nuclear accident (Behling and Hildebrand, 1986). Due to its inert nature, xenon is not appreciably scavenged from the atmosphere following a release, and can therefore can travel long distances and be detected with sufficiently sensitive instruments.…”

Maximum reasonable radioxenon releases from medical isotope production facilities and their effect on monitoring nuclear explosions

“…The benefit of using highly sensitive systems was seen following the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) nuclear test of 2006, which was reported by a Swedish noble gas system using similar technology as that used in the IMS (Ringbom et al, 2009), as well as a system in Yellowknife, Canada (Saey et al, 2007). Conversely in 2009 during a second DPRK nuclear test, no xenon emissions whatsoever were reported following the DPRK announcement arguing that if radioxenon emissions occurred from that event, then lower detection thresholds may have been useful.…”

“…The reality is that operationally, the detection of multiple isotopes has not been reliable in all cases; therefore, other means are needed to increase confidence when radioxenon is detected. Specifically, following the 2006 DPRK announced nuclear test, two separate groups reported xenon detections, one of which was based on two isotopes ( 133 Xe and 133m Xe) (Ringbom et al, 2009), and the other based on only one ( 133 Xe) (Saey et al, 2007).…”

A Bayesian method with empirically fitted priors for the evaluation of environmental radioactivity: application to low-level radioxenon measurements

“…Moreover, when analyzing a possible violation of the Treaty [22], a proven detection of this isotope would be important for two reasons: first, with its comparatively low yield when produced by the fission of uranium or plutonium [23], its detection -unless at extremely low concentrations compared to 133 Xe -is rather indicative of fissions accumulated over time (like from operating NPP) as opposed to non-detectable concentrations (with minimal containment of a nuclear test) that would be released from the instantaneous fissions of a covert nuclear explosion; second, its presence may not only reveal a different fission scenario, but it is also a tracer of long term atmospheric transport, and a potential indicator of mixtures of air masses that need to be taken into account when ascribing consistent source terms and scenarios to the observations.…”