McTaggart and the Truth about Time

Dyke, Heather

doi:10.1017/cbo9780511550263.008

Cited by 10 publications

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“…But many eternalists think this move fails, and the A-theory is incoherent (Dyke 2001(Dyke , 2002b ; see also Thomson 2001 for discussion of these issues). One possibility is that we understand the idea that the A-properties are had at different times , in terms of a second temporal dimension.…”

Section: Defi Nitional Woesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The standard move on behalf of dynamical theories is to point out that no event need have all three properties at the same time (lowe 1992, 2011). But many eternalists think this move fails, and the A-theory is incoherent (Dyke 2001(Dyke , 2002b; see also Thomson 2001 for discussion of these issues). One possibility is that we understand the idea that the A-properties are had at different times, in terms of a second temporal dimension.…”

Section: Definitional Woesmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Presentism, Eternalism, and the Growing Block

Miller

2013

A Companion to the Philosophy of Time

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Presentism, eternalism, and growing-blockism are theories or models of what the temporal and ontic structure of the world is, or could be. i shall set aside the question of whether whichever theory is true is necessarily true or only contingently true. since defenders of each of these views at the very least think that they are competing views about the way our world is in fact, i focus discussion on this aspect of the dialectic.Presentism, eternalism, and growing-blockism are, in part, theories about what exists. "Exists" is used in ordinary English in a number of ways. To understand what is at issue between these three views we need to understand what each view intends when it makes claims about what exists. suppose i stand in my kitchen and utter the following three claims:A. There is no santa Claus. B. There is no beer. C. There are no dinosaurs.When i utter (B) in my kitchen, what i say is true. That is because it is natural to understand me as claiming that there is no beer in my kitchen. since there is beer at the local shop, the claim that there is no beer at all anywhere is false. That is, the claim "there is no beer" is false if we do not relativize the claim to some particular domain, like my kitchen, in which there is no beer.When i utter (A) this is also true. 1 But a natural reading of my utterance of (A) in my kitchen is not that that there is no santa Claus in my kitchen, though that is true, but that there is no santa Claus anywhere: no santa simpliciter, as we put it. The difference between (A) and (B) is that a natural reading of (B) tacitly restricts the domain 21 A Companion to the Philosophy of Time, First Edition. Edited by Heather Dyke and Adrian Bardon.

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Section: Defi Nitional Woesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Definitional Woesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Presentism, Eternalism, and the Growing Block

Miller

2013

A Companion to the Philosophy of Time

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“…Some supporters of the B-theory includeDeng (2013),Dyke (2002),Leininger (2021),Mozersky (2015) andSider (2001;2011) andWilliams (1951).9 As characterized by the pioneering research ofEinstein (1952) andMinkowski (1952).…”

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confidence: 99%

Postoji li promjena prema B-teoriji vremena?

Banfi

2021

EuJAP

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The purpose of this paper is to explore the connection between change and the B-theory of time, sometimes also called the Scientific view of time, according to which reality is a four-dimensional spacetime manifold, where past, present and future things equally exist, and the present time and non-present times are metaphysically the same. I argue in favour of a novel response to the much-vexed question of whether there is change on the B-theory or not. In fact, B-theorists are often said to hold a ‘static’ view of time. But this far from being innocent label: if the B-theory of time presents a model of temporal reality that is static, then there is no change on the B-theory. From this, one can reasonably think as follows: of course, there is change, so the B-theory must be false. What I plan to do in this paper is to argue that in some sense there is change on the B-theory, but in some other sense, there is no change on the B-theory. To do so, I present three instances of change: Existential Change, namely the view that things change with respect to their existence over time; Qualitative Change, the view that things change with respect to how they are over time; Propositional Change, namely the view that things (i.e. propositions) change with respect to truth value over time. I argue that while there is a reading of these three instances of change that is true on the B-theory, and so there is change on the B-theory in this sense, there is a B-theoretical reading of each of them that is not true on the B-theory, and therefore there is no change on the B-theory in this other sense.

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“… For example, McTaggart famously claims that the A‐theory is inconsistent (McTaggart ). Others including Dyke (); Smith (); Oaklander () have followed. …”

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confidence: 99%

The Unique Groundability of Temporal Facts

Cusbert

Miller

2017

Philos Phenomenol Research

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The A-theory and the B-theory advance competing claims about how time is grounded. The A-theory says that A-facts are more fundamental in grounding time than are B-facts, and the B-theory says the reverse. We argue that whichever theory is true of the actual world is also true of all possible worlds containing time. We do this by arguing that time is uniquely groundable: however time is actually grounded, it is necessarily grounded in that way. It follows that if either the A-theory or the B-theory is actually false, then it is necessarily false. 1 Defenders of "contingentism" about a variety of metaphysical areas include: Cameron (2007), Miller (

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McTaggart and the Truth about Time

Cited by 10 publications

References 0 publications

Presentism, Eternalism, and the Growing Block

Presentism, Eternalism, and the Growing Block

Postoji li promjena prema B-teoriji vremena?

The Unique Groundability of Temporal Facts

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