Mathematically Assessing the Consequences of Food Terrorism Scenarios

Abstract

We derive mathematical expressions for the mean number of casualties resulting from a deliberate release of a biological or chemical agent into a food supply chain. Our analysis first computes the amount of contaminated food as a function of the network topology and vessel sizes in the food processing plant. A probabilistic analysis, in which each potential consumer of contaminated food has his own random purchase time, infectious dose, and incubation period, determines the number of people who consume enough tainted food to get infected or poisoned before the attack is detected and food consumption is halted. These simple formulas can be used by the U.S. government and the food industry to develop a rough-cut prioritization of the threats from food terrorism, which would be a 1st step toward the allocation of appropriate prevention and mitigation resources.

Immunosorbent analysis of ricin contamination in milk using colorimetric, chemiluminescent and electrochemiluminescent detection

“…However, ricin is extremely toxic by parenteral routes of administration (LD 50 about 3 mg/kg), and has been responsible for both intentional and apparently accidental poisoning (Misra, 2010). The documented criminal use of ricin and the evidence of bulk production of ricin for apparent terrorist use have been discussed (Olsnes, 2004), and analyses of milk and other targets for foodborne terrorism have been presented (Liu & Wein, 2008;Wein & Liu, 2005). One so-called 'white powder incident' involving ricin poisoning was extensively investigated using immunochemical and molecular screening techniques, as well as mass spectroscopic structural and activity assays for ricin (Schieltz et al, 2011).…”

Types of fraud in meat and meat products: a review.

“…Por ejemplo, se han producido envenenamientos causados por el herbicida "paraquat" y otros pesticidas incluyendo insecticidas organofosforados, cianato de potasio y arsénico en alimentos (Yoshida, 2008); así como también la inclusión de toxinas botulínicas en leche como escenario catastrófico de terrorismo alimentario (Wein y Liu, 2005)., así también como modelos matemáticos para analizar las probabilidades de ocurrencia. (Liu y Wein, 2008). A causa de un fácil acceso a las compras por Internet hay más oportunidad de adquirir sustancias tóxicas tanto en la importación y exportación de alimentos.…”

Historical and economic aspects of bioterrorism

“…According to the estimations of Liu and Wein (2008), if the terrorists were able to ingest 1 g botulinum toxin into the milk supply system in the USA, 50,000 gallon (1 standard American gallon = 3,785 l) milk would get poisoned. In this case the number of casualties would exceed 100,000.…”