2019
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3357693
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Marriage Market Dynamics, Gender, and the Age Gap

Abstract: We present a general discrete choice framework for analysing household formation and dissolution decisions in an equilibrium limited-commitment collective framework that allows for marriage both within and across birth cohorts. Using Panel Study of Income Dynamics and American Community Survey data, we apply our framework to empirically implement a time allocation model with labour market earnings risk, human capital accumulation, home production activities, fertility, and both within-and across-cohort marital… Show more

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Cited by 9 publications
(2 citation statements)
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“…Chiappori and Mazzoco (2017) provide a comprehensive summary of this line of research. A synthesis of the structural literature on marriage market equilibrium and intrahousehold allocation is emerging (see Chiappori et al (2019), Gousse et al (2019) and Shephard (2019)).…”
Section: Population Economicsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Chiappori and Mazzoco (2017) provide a comprehensive summary of this line of research. A synthesis of the structural literature on marriage market equilibrium and intrahousehold allocation is emerging (see Chiappori et al (2019), Gousse et al (2019) and Shephard (2019)).…”
Section: Population Economicsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Alternatively, I could have obtained the same level of assortative mating by education assuming random meeting probabilities and that the couple receives an additional utility flow based on her and her partner's education.28 This value is taken from the PSID.29 In the life cycle models featured inCiscato (2019),Shephard (2019) andReynoso (2019) assortative mating arises in marriage markets through the interactions of preferences, incentives, supply and demand forces.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%