Recent years have witnessed a resurgence of trade protectionism, either vocally used as an electoral tool or more discretely implemented within WTO rules. On the one hand, the US-China trade war that has erupted in 2018 over steel and aluminium has often made the news, helped by the size of the two contenders. The reciprocal, unilateral imposition of tariffs has spilled over to other products, from agricultural commodities to 5G technology, and other countries as well, with the US threatening to sanction automotive imports from the EU and Japan on national security grounds. On the other hand, a less vocal yet more pervasive trend has started in the aftermath of the 2007-2008 financial crisis, with several countries imposing discriminatory measures to favour domestic firms (Evenett 2019), and has gained prominence in the context of the fight against the COVID-19 pandemic, when many countries have resorted to trade restrictions ranging from export licenses to outright export bans (Pauwelyn 2020) in the attempt to secure domestic availability of necessary goods such as protective garments, medical equipment, or simply food.The context where these events take place is one where the rule-based system that has governed international trade flows since the Bretton Wood era, built around the GATT and the WTO, is in jeopardy. Since the mid-2000, the lack of progress in the Doha round of multilateral negotiations signalled the difficulties associated with each country holding a de facto veto power. Moreover, the WTO dispute settlement crisis that erupted in 2019, with the Appellate Body unable to function for a lack of This special section originates from the 14th meeting of the International Study Group on Export and Productivity (ISGEP), held in Trento in September 2019. The guest editors would like to thank Chiara Tomasi and Min Zhu, who contributed to the organisation of the workshop.