Markets for Water Rights under Environmental Constraints

Weber, Marian

doi:10.1006/jeem.2000.1149

Cited by 51 publications

(34 citation statements)

References 9 publications

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“…As discussed in [12], these instruments can be divided into three groups. First, there is the possibility to use an ambient permit system, as in [9] and [13]. This system achieves a least-cost implementation of a pollution standard with minimal informational requirements for the regulating authority.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The optimal size of a permit market

Krysiak

Schweitzer

2010

Journal of Environmental Economics and Management

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The optimal size of a permit market

Krysiak

Schweitzer

2010

Journal of Environmental Economics and Management

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“…In fact, Weber (2001) has considered the problem of allocating water and pollution rights along a river. But, in Weber (2001), there is a single source of water. There are no branches or inflows at various locations of the agents.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Recently, there have been a number of papers considering the water pollution problem. Examples include Weber (2001), Hung and Shaw (2005), Ni and Wang (2007).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Sharing a Polluted River Network

Dong

Wang

2007

SSRN Journal

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A polluted river network is populated with agents (e.g., firms, villages, municipalities, or countries) located upstream and downstream. This river network must be cleaned, the costs of which must be shared among the agents. We model this problem as a cost sharing problem on a tree network. Based on the two theories in international disputes, namely the Absolute Territorial Sovereignty (ATS) and the Unlimitted Territorial Integrity (UTI), we propose three different cost sharing methods for the problem. They are the Local Responsibility Sharing (LRS), the Upstream Equal Sharing (UES), and the Downstream Equal Sharing (DES), respectively. The LRS and the UES generalize Ni and Wang ("Sharing a polluted river", Games Econ. Behav., 60 (2007), 176-186) but the DES is new. The DES is based on a new interpretation of the UTI. We provide axiomatic characterizations for the three methods. We also show that they coincide with the Shapley values of the three different games that can be defined for the problem. Moreover, we show that they are in the cores of the three games, respectively. Our methods can shed light on pollution abatement of a river network with multiple sovereignties.JEL classification: C71, D61, D62.

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“…This is appropriate for water market structures where suppliers can supply water users at other locations, but are hampered by capacity or (physical) trade restrictions, as is the case in e.g. US and Australian water markets (Weber 2001;Bjornlund 2004;Brennan 2006;Chong and Sunding 2006). In many such markets, a gravity-driven infrastructure facilitates trade from upstream to downstream, but excludes opposite water flows.…”

Section: Private Resources and Gravity-driven Water Tradementioning

confidence: 99%

Market power in water markets

Ansink

Houba

2012

Journal of Environmental Economics and Management

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. We model water markets with market power as multi-market Cournot competition with a river structure. Suppliers are connected through the water balances, which imposes resource constraints, and are connected to heterogeneous water users via a water delivery infrastructure. Our model captures a wide range of specific water market structures. We establish conditions for existence of an equilibrium with market power. Each supplier only serves users with maximal marginal revenues. The monopoly case is similar to the standard one, but three other specific water market structures illustrate that standard intuition has to be revisited. Multiple equilibria may arise for common resources. Terms of use: Documents in

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Markets for Water Rights under Environmental Constraints

Cited by 51 publications

References 9 publications

The optimal size of a permit market

The optimal size of a permit market

Sharing a Polluted River Network

Market power in water markets

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