1994
DOI: 10.1016/0165-4101(94)90004-3
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Market liquidity and volume around earnings announcements

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Cited by 1,448 publications
(819 citation statements)
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References 14 publications
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“…This is because the information not disclosed at the issue stage may still be uncovered by sophisticated investors later on, especially if it enables them to earn large rents in secondary market trading. 6 So limiting transparency at the issue stage induces more subsequent information acquisition by sophisticated investors and shifts the adverse selection problem to the secondary market, reducing its liquidity or even inducing 4 In keeping with this argument, Kim and Verrecchia (1994) show that earnings announcements lead to lower market liquidity if they allow sophisticated traders to increase their informational advantage over other traders. The same argument is used by Goel and Thakor (2003) to rationalize earning smoothing: to maintain a liquid market for their stocks, companies will smooth earnings so as to reduce the informational rents of sophisticated investors.…”
mentioning
confidence: 68%
“…This is because the information not disclosed at the issue stage may still be uncovered by sophisticated investors later on, especially if it enables them to earn large rents in secondary market trading. 6 So limiting transparency at the issue stage induces more subsequent information acquisition by sophisticated investors and shifts the adverse selection problem to the secondary market, reducing its liquidity or even inducing 4 In keeping with this argument, Kim and Verrecchia (1994) show that earnings announcements lead to lower market liquidity if they allow sophisticated traders to increase their informational advantage over other traders. The same argument is used by Goel and Thakor (2003) to rationalize earning smoothing: to maintain a liquid market for their stocks, companies will smooth earnings so as to reduce the informational rents of sophisticated investors.…”
mentioning
confidence: 68%
“…Yet, for the U.S. sample, the same result cannot be found, a fact that may be linked to the liquidity and informational environment of this market, which is bigger than the Brazilian one, resulting in information being discounted from share prices faster than in Brazil; also similar to what was mentioned in section 2.1 in this study (Lee et al, 1993;Kim & Verrecchia, 1994;Blankespoor et al, 2014).…”
Section: Results For the Influence Of Social Network On The Pricing mentioning
confidence: 42%
“…Looking at information asymmetry, Blankespoor et al (2014) emphasize in their work that, at least in the short term, the release of a particular item of news can really increase information asymmetry (if it is used for this objective); however, Kim and Verrecchia (1994) and Lee, Mucklow, and Ready (1993) found empirical evidence that increases in information asymmetry last less than an hour.…”
Section: Social Network and Information Asymmetrymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…First, the above-mentioned literature suggests that lower information asymmetry between investors is associated with decreased bid-ask spreads. This notion is supported, for instance, by a model developed by Kim and Verrecchia (1994), in which uninformed market makers increase bid-ask spreads to compensate for losses resulting from trading with more informed investors. Empirical support for this notion is provided by Glosten and Harris (1988), Welker (1995), Coller and Yohn (1997), Healy et al (1999) or Leuz and Verrecchia (2000).…”
Section: Hypothesis Developmentmentioning
confidence: 75%