Market Definition and the Merger Guidelines

Kaplow, Louis

doi:10.1007/s11151-011-9305-9

Cited by 20 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 18 publications

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“…It would also lead to a (re)harmonization of ex-post and ex-ante rules within the German competition law system. As a welcomed side effect, the relevance of an exact market definition could decrease -as leading economists have long demanded (Farrell & Shapiro 2010;Kaplow 2011Kaplow , 2015. This may help to prevent the failure of cases in which (Schwalbe 2020a, b).…”

Section: "Outstanding Relevance Across Markets" In Merger Control?mentioning

confidence: 99%

The Draft for the 10th Amendment of German Competition Law: Towards a new Concept of 'Outstanding Relevance across Markets'?

2020

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The ministerial proposal for a 10 th amendment of the German competition law particularly addresses abuse control and seeks to tighten this pillar of competition policy against the background of the challenges from the digital economy. Next to extending the classic policy instruments of abuse control, the reform proposal suggests to introduce an additional and novel type of market power: the outstanding relevance across markets (ORAM). From an economic perspective, such an institution is interesting as it emphasizes non-horizontal and less direct anticompetitive abuses of market power. We review what type of cases could be subject to such a concept of systemic market power. Furthermore, we address the question whether merger control could also benefit from an ORAM-style conception.

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Section: "Outstanding Relevance Across Markets" In Merger Control?mentioning

confidence: 99%

The Draft for the 10th Amendment of German Competition Law: Towards a new Concept of 'Outstanding Relevance across Markets'?

2020

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“…Eine Ergänzung des überwiegend horizontal wirkenden ersten Regelbeispiels (Marktbeherrschung) um ein insbesondere auf vertikale und konglomerate Effekte ausgerichtetes zweites Regelbeispiel (ÜMÜB) wäre aus (daten-)ökonomischer Sicht zu begrüßen (Salop 2018;Stöhr et al 2020) und würde zudem auch eine (Re-) Harmonisierung der Ex-Post-und Ex-Ante-Regelungen innerhalb des GWB bedeuten. Als erfreulicher Nebeneffekt könnte die Relevanz einer exakten Marktabgrenzung abnehmen -wie K es von führenden Ökonomen schon lange gefordert wird (Farrell & Shapiro 2010;Kaplow 2011Kaplow , 2015 -und damit verhindert werden, dass Fälle scheitern, bei denen antikompetitive Effekte ökonomisch nachgewiesen wurden, aber bei denen die juristische Exaktheit der Marktabgrenzung Entscheidungen zu Fall gebracht hat (bspw. Tetra Laval/Sidel; Oracle/PeopleSoft).…”

Section: Ex-ante-strukturkontrolle Vs Ex-post-verhaltenskontrolle Auunclassified

Der Entwurf zur 10. GWB Novelle: Interventionismus oder Laissez-faire?

2020

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ZusammenfassungDie 10. Novelle des Gesetzes gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen („GWB-Digitalisierungsgesetz“) soll die deutschen Wettbewerbsregeln so reformieren, dass sie einen geeigneten Ordnungsrahmen für eine zunehmend digitalisierte Wirtschaft darstellen. Im vorliegenden Beitrag diskutieren wir den entsprechenden Referentenentwurf (Januar 2020) aus Sicht der modernen Wirtschaftstheorie. Dabei gehen wir insbesondere auf die Eignung der erheblichen Ausweitung der Missbrauchsaufsicht für einen besseren Wettbewerbsschutz in der Digitalwirtschaft ein. Die Schaffung eines Konzeptes überlegener marktübergreifender Bedeutung (ÜMÜB) sowie die stärkere Betonung relativer Marktmacht und ökonomischer Abhängigkeit sind dabei grundsätzlich zu begrüßen, um moderne Versionen des Behinderungswettbewerbs effektiver bekämpfen zu können. Allerdings fehlen stellenweise Schranken für zu weit gehende Interventionen in den Leistungswettbewerb. Kritisch ist hingegen, dass die Zusammenschlusskontrolle tendenziell geschwächt wird. Wir schlagen vor, im Gegenteil die Ex-Ante-Strukturkontrolle zu stärken, indem das ÜMÜB-Konzept auch in die Zusammenschlusskontrolle integriert wird. Dies würde den gewünschten Ordnungsrahmen für die Digitalwirtschaft verbessern. Schließlich hinterfragen wir die Auswirkungen der geplanten Novellierung auf das europäische System der Wettbewerbspolitiken.

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“…In an antitrust world where the (simple) economics of (standard) homogenous goods dominate, sound market delineation is paramount to exactly quantify market shares which play an important role in assessing (anti-) competitive effects. 13 However, in the more complex world of heterogeneous goods, an anticompetitive impact on the process of competition does not depend that strongly on market shares anymore and, consequently, market delineation loses its gatekeeper character for competitive analysis (Farrell & Shapiro 2010;Kaplow 2011Kaplow , 2015. The effects of digitization further decrease the role of market delineation for the antitrust assessment of business practices and intercompany arrangements both due to the multisided platform character and due to the peculiar role of data (see section 2.1 and 2.2).…”

Section: Do European Rules Need Institutional Change?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Competition policy reform in Europe and Germany – institutional change in the light of digitization

Budzinski

Stöhr

2018

European Competition Journal

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The ubiquitous process of digitization changes economic competition on markets in several ways and leads to the emergence of new business models. The increasing roles of digital platforms as well as data-driven markets represent two relevant examples. These developments challenge competition policy, which must consider the special economic characteristics of digital goods and markets. In Germany, national competition law was amended in 2017 in order to accommodate for digitization-driven changes in the economy and plans for further changes are already discussed. We review this institutional change from an economics perspective and argue that most of the reform's elements point into the right direction. However, some upcoming challenges may have been overlooked so far. Furthermore, we discuss whether European competition policy should follow the paragon of the German reform and amend its institutional framework accordingly. We find scope for reform particularly regarding data-driven markets, whereas platform economics appear to be already well-established.

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Market Definition and the Merger Guidelines

Abstract: The recently issued revision of the U

Cited by 20 publications

References 18 publications

The Draft for the 10th Amendment of German Competition Law: Towards a new Concept of 'Outstanding Relevance across Markets'?

The Draft for the 10th Amendment of German Competition Law: Towards a new Concept of 'Outstanding Relevance across Markets'?

Der Entwurf zur 10. GWB Novelle: Interventionismus oder Laissez-faire?

Competition policy reform in Europe and Germany – institutional change in the light of digitization

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