Mapping Covid-19 Governance in Lebanon: Territories of Sectarianism and Solidarity

Abstract

Many states, including Lebanon, have used the Covid-19 pandemic as an occasion to reassert their power and to consolidate their policing and repressive apparatuses. We are far from a seamless scenario, however. Rather than a mere reproduction of the sectarian political system, we argue in this paper that the governance of the pandemic in Lebanon reveals tensions between powerful political parties, weakened public agencies, as well as multiple solidarity groups with diverging aspirations, colliding over the imagined future of the country. Using various sources of information (broadcast, print and online news media, social media), we build a database of the types of actors and the categories of actions across locations, and analyze the territorial and political variations of the governance of the pandemic. The paper demonstrates that the Covid-19 response in Lebanon operates through ongoing negotiations over the national territory in which timid yet visible aspirations for a non-sectarian country confront sectarian territorialities through back-and-forth cycles.

Movement under state and non-state authorities during COVID-19: Evidence from Lebanon

“…We consider the presence and actions of other actors, since INGOs and NGOs played a considerable role in the country's response to COVID-19. Drawing upon data collected by Harb et al (2021) on various political authorities' responses to COVID-19 in Lebanon from March to June 2020, we find that INGOs and NGOs were less active in districts with private Hezbollah governance than other districts of Lebanon. Second, we find that controlling for INGOs' and NGOs' presence in our models does not change the main results.…”

“…Yet, data from Harb et al (2021) show that law enforcement actions in relation to COVID-19 is higher in areas with private Hezbollah governance than other areas. Controlling for law enforcement actions does not change the main results (see Table A12 in the appendix).…”

“…For instance, in Baalbek, Nabatiyeh, and Sour – the districts we identify as having private Hezbollah governance –Harb et al (2021) found that about a third of actions taken in response to the pandemic were carried out by INGOs, NGOs, and civil society actors. ( Harb et al, 2021 ). We address this empirically in robustness checks.…”

“…Three pieces of evidence suggest these explanations may not drive the statistical results. First, comparing districts with private Hezbollah governance to other districts of Lebanon, on average, authorities engaged in fewer instances of preventive measures (including quarantine facilities, aid and relief, and medical services) ( Harb et al, 2021 ). Second, if we control for the total number of episodes of preventive measures in each district from March–July 2020, our main results remain robust (see Table A13 in the appendix).…”

“… 15 We create an additive measure that includes episodes of aid and relief, medical services, quarantine facilities, and preventive measures, as measured by Harb et al, 2021 . Monthly data is unavailable.…”