2008
DOI: 10.1093/rof/rfn014
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Managerial Incentives and Corporate Fraud: The Sources of Incentives Matter*

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Cited by 380 publications
(210 citation statements)
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References 36 publications
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“…A study by Baker, Collins, and Reitenga (2003) suggests that managers are more likely to engage in earnings management when their total compensation depends heavily on financial performance, as through stock options. Johnson, Ryan, and Tian (2008) report that these effects are most pronounced when compensation consists of vested options or unrestricted stock, when managers would feel the effect of a drop in stock price most acutely.…”
Section: Management's Rolementioning
confidence: 99%
“…A study by Baker, Collins, and Reitenga (2003) suggests that managers are more likely to engage in earnings management when their total compensation depends heavily on financial performance, as through stock options. Johnson, Ryan, and Tian (2008) report that these effects are most pronounced when compensation consists of vested options or unrestricted stock, when managers would feel the effect of a drop in stock price most acutely.…”
Section: Management's Rolementioning
confidence: 99%
“…Our study is an extension of prior literature documenting that managers inflate earnings in order to maximize the value of their equity compensation via higher stock valuations (Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006;Burns and Kedia, 2006;Cheng and Warfield, 2005;Efendi et al, 2007;Goldman and Slezak, 2006;Harris and Bromiley, 2007;Johnson et al, 2009).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 92%
“…Although the presence of an incentive can increase cheating, larger and more valued incentives can lead to even more unethical conduct, as demonstrated by Harris and Bromiley (2007), who reported that the “percentage of CEO compensation delivered via stock option grants significantly influences financial misrepresentation” (p. 350). Others have also found a link between larger incentives leading to greater unethical conduct (Murdock & Anderman, 2006; Johnson, Ryan, & Tian, 2009). …”
Section: Incentivesmentioning
confidence: 99%