Abstract:University Paris IX, Dauphine, and DIAL, Paris. Gautier, Marouani and Raffinot dedicate this article to the memory of Idrissa Dante, who tragically died before the final results of their collaboration could be published. The report on which the article is based benefited from the comments of Howard White, Günter Hornung (GTZ, Bamako) and an IMF team whom the authors would like to thank for their comments. 1. Notably, the existence of a previous UNDP-driven National Poverty Alleviation Strategy (SNLP) created p… Show more
“…Although the strategy paper predates the coup, the government of President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta, elected in 2013, remains committed to it, according to most accounts. Even if it was drafted with some international assistance, key respondents almost unanimously agreed that there is a high degree of national ownership of the CSCRP, which was drawn up after a complex and inclusive consultation process-in contrast with previous strategy papers (Bergamaschi et al 2007;Cissoko and Touré 2005;Dante et al 2003;Wood et al 2011: 111).…”
This paper examines the application of the first two principles of the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, namely ownership and alignment, to the cases of Mali and Ghana. It argues that Western donors and recipient governments have adopted the Paris Principles mainly in form, rather than in substance, not because of a lack of capacity but rather due primarily to a lack of will, related to interests and incentives on both sides to maintain the pre-Paris status quo. As a result, the impact on Mali's and Ghana's relationships with their traditional donors has been minimal and short-lasting. To the extent that donors and recipients have not significantly changed their practices in either Mali (a poor, fragile, aid-dependent country with low state capacity) or Ghana (a wealthier and more stable country with greater capacity), it seems unlikely that they will be able to apply the Paris Principles elsewhere. Together, the cases of Mali and Ghana, placed in a broader context, suggest that the Paris Agenda is dying.
“…Although the strategy paper predates the coup, the government of President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta, elected in 2013, remains committed to it, according to most accounts. Even if it was drafted with some international assistance, key respondents almost unanimously agreed that there is a high degree of national ownership of the CSCRP, which was drawn up after a complex and inclusive consultation process-in contrast with previous strategy papers (Bergamaschi et al 2007;Cissoko and Touré 2005;Dante et al 2003;Wood et al 2011: 111).…”
This paper examines the application of the first two principles of the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, namely ownership and alignment, to the cases of Mali and Ghana. It argues that Western donors and recipient governments have adopted the Paris Principles mainly in form, rather than in substance, not because of a lack of capacity but rather due primarily to a lack of will, related to interests and incentives on both sides to maintain the pre-Paris status quo. As a result, the impact on Mali's and Ghana's relationships with their traditional donors has been minimal and short-lasting. To the extent that donors and recipients have not significantly changed their practices in either Mali (a poor, fragile, aid-dependent country with low state capacity) or Ghana (a wealthier and more stable country with greater capacity), it seems unlikely that they will be able to apply the Paris Principles elsewhere. Together, the cases of Mali and Ghana, placed in a broader context, suggest that the Paris Agenda is dying.
“…In Tanzania and Uganda national trade unions were told they could participate in the PRSP process only after the PRSP had already been completed and endorsed by the IFIs (ICFTU 2002). In Mali, neither trade unions and nor the important Cotton Producers' Association participated at all (Dante et al 2003). There has been some evidence however of trade unions enjoying substantive participation in transition countries where as a result of the Soviet legacy there have been traditionally close relations between governments and trade unions (ODI 2003b).…”
Section: Groups Missing From Consultationsmentioning
Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) have been introduced by the World Bank and the IMF as a necessary aspect of securing HIPC debt relief and access to other funds. They are intended to increase national 'ownership' of programmes, through extensive participation. This paper assesses whether they actually do empower poor countries, by exploring the process and content of the PRSPs. It finds that as far as civil society is concerned, the PRSPs currently permit little significant contribution to programme design. Governments appear to take a bigger role, but are also heavily constrained, especially with respect to macro-policy. The fact that the content of PRSPs is very similar to previous adjustment packages suggest that little real change has occurred through this process. Moreover, some large IFI programmes are unaffected by the process. Hence PRSPs do not significantly empower poor countries. They may give the appearance of greater ownership, but so long as there is no significant underlying change, such a change in perceptions about ownership, which could make IFI designed programmes more effective and thereby empower them, is likely to be short lived
“…This aid dependency has resulted in policymaking processes dominated by donors, lack of national ownership of plans for development and poverty reduction, and national planning capacities which are weak in comparison to what is needed to satisfy donor demands (Dante et al 2003;Bergamaschi 2009;Van de Walle 2012). Van de Walle (2012) notes that donor reports comment that national capacities for policymaking and public administration are improving, but that similar observations have been made as far back as the 1960s.…”
Section: Aid Dependency and The Influence Of Donorsmentioning
This paper argues that approaches to understanding local institutions for natural resource management based on "critical institutionalism" (Cleaver 2012), which emphasises the importance of improvisation and adaptation across different scales, can be placed within broader political economy analysis frameworks for assessing challenges in public services delivery from national to local levels. The paper uses such an extended political economy analysis approach to understand the role of the international NGO WaterAid and its partners in Mali in relation to institutions for financing rural water services, drawing on collaborative research undertaken in 2010 and 2011. The case study shows that WaterAid's approach can be understood through elements of both mainstream and critical institutionalist thinking. At local government level, WaterAid primarily promotes formal institutional arrangements, which exhibit the challenge of "reforms as signals" (Andrews 2013), where institutional reforms appear to happen but lack the intended function. However, the work of WaterAid's partners at community level supports processes of "institutional bricolage" through which they try to gradually work with local actors to find ways of 'best fit' for financing rural water services which adapt existing local practices into new arrangements.
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