Making Quantified Truths True

Aspeitia, Axel Arturo Barceló

doi:10.1007/978-3-319-18362-6_15

Synthese Library

2015

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-18362-6_15

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Making Quantified Truths True

Axel Arturo Barceló Aspeitia¹

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Cited by 3 publications

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“…Thus, more generally, each of these three arguments aims to support the moral that metaphysical theories-or at least Humean Supervenience, the Growing-Block theory, and presentism-are little constrained by truthmaking commitments. Hence, this paper aims to contribute to the debate about the methodology and legitimacy of metaphysics by urging caution on widespread strategies stemming from the twentieth century linguistic turn-along the lines of Lewis (1992); Varzi (2007); Wisnewski (2007); Liggins (2008); Betti (2014); Simpson (2014); Skiles (2014); Barceló (2015); Tallant (2018); Asay and Baron (2019); among others (see also references in §3.2).…”

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confidence: 99%

On Metaphysics’ Independence from Truthmaking. Or, Why Humean Supervenience is Compatible with the Growing Block Universe

Filomeno

2021

Erkenn

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This paper aims to support the claim that analytic metaphysics should be more cautious regarding the constraints that truthmaking considerations impose on metaphysical theories. To this end, I reply to Briggs and Forbes (2017), who argue that certain truthmaking commitments are incurred by a Humean metaphysics and by the Growing-Block theory. First, I argue that Humean Supervenience does not need to endorse a standard version of truthmaker maximalism. This undermines Briggs and Forbes's conclusion that Humean Supervenience and the Growing-Block theory are incompatible. Second, I argue that the Growing-Block theory does not commit us to any weaker version of truthmaker maximalism, which also undermines Briggs and Forbes's conclusion. Finally, I point out other reasons to think that any version of truthmaker maximalism is disputable, undermining a fortiori Briggs and Forbes's conclusion and supporting the moral that metaphysical theories-or at least Humean Supervenience, the Growing-Block theory, and presentism-are little constrained by truthmaking commitments.

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On Metaphysics’ Independence from Truthmaking. Or, Why Humean Supervenience is Compatible with the Growing Block Universe

Filomeno

2021

Erkenn

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Grounding nonexistence

Muñoz

2019

Inquiry

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<i>Truthmaker Monism</i>

YUKIMOTO

Kõyama

2020

Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science

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Monism is a metaphysical view according to which there is only one fundamental object. This paper will explore monism within the context of truthmaker theory, or Truthmaker Monism, a view rarely discussed in literature. Although few truthmaker theorists defend monism, at least explicitly, some theories seem to share the spirit of monism to some extent. Interestingly, they are proposed as solutions for the same problem, called the problem of negative truth. A close examination will show that while each of these solutions can account for the problem, they are unsatisfactory for different reasons. This paper will suggest a novel solution to the problem of negative truth which preserves the advantages of existing solutions while avoiding the difficulties with which they are faced.

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Making Quantified Truths True

Cited by 3 publications

References 36 publications

On Metaphysics’ Independence from Truthmaking. Or, Why Humean Supervenience is Compatible with the Growing Block Universe

On Metaphysics’ Independence from Truthmaking. Or, Why Humean Supervenience is Compatible with the Growing Block Universe

Grounding nonexistence

<i>Truthmaker Monism</i>

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