Making monetary markets transparent: the European Central Bank's communication policy and its interactions with the media

Velthuis, Olav

doi:10.1080/03085147.2015.1013355

Cited by 35 publications

(19 citation statements)

References 48 publications

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“…The literature on central bank communication has largely ignored this divide -including in political economy, sociology, and anthropology (Braun 2015;Holmes 2014;Krippner 2007;Nelson/Katzenstein 2014). This literature has focused on the communicative interaction between central bankers and a select group of financial and business elites, thus reproducing the "methodological elitism" (Stanley/Jackson 2016) of rational expectations macroeconomics (however, see Velthuis 2015). From this perspective, the 3 challenge for monetary policymakers consists of managing expectations, and the solution comes in the form of central bank transparency.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Speaking to the people? Money, trust, and central bank legitimacy in the age of quantitative easing

Braun

2016

Review of International Political Economy

112

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. MPIfG Discussion Papers are refereed scholarly papers of the kind that are publishable in a peer-reviewed disciplinary journal. Their objective is to contribute to the cumulative improvement of theoretical knowledge. The papers can be ordered from the institute for a small fee (hard copies) or downloaded free of charge (PDF). Terms of use: Documents in ZusammenfassungDie durch die Finanzkrise und die unkonventionellen Maßnahmen der Zentralbanken bewirkte Politisierung des Geldes erlaubt einen seltenen Einblick in den Zusammenhang zwischen Geldvertrauen und Zentralbanklegitimität. Die Kommunikation von Zentralbanken mit der breiten Öffentlichkeit -im Gegensatz zur gut erforschten Kommunikation mit Finanzmärkten bisher weitgehend vernachlässigt -sieht sich mit einem Dilemma konfrontiert. Einerseits hängt die Legitimität der Zentralbank davon ab, ob ihr Handeln den Maximen entspricht, die sich aus der in der Öffentlichkeit vorherrschenden Theorie des Geldes ableiten. Andererseits weicht diese Theorie in wichtigen Punkten von der tatsächlichen Funktionsweise des Geldsystems ab. Wie Zentralbanken mit diesem Dilemma umgehen, hängt von der allgemeinen geldpolitischen Situation ab. Anhand der Beispiele der Deutschen Bundesbank und der Europäischen Zentralbank wird argumentiert, dass Zentralbanker unter inflationären Bedingungen die Öffentlich-keit gerne in dem Glauben lassen, die Geldmenge sei vollständig von der Zentralbank kontrolliert. Die außergewöhnliche Initiative der Bank of England, die Öffentlichkeit von der Irrtümlichkeit dieser Vorstellung zu überzeugen, zeigt hingegen, dass deflationärer Druck und rapide geldpolitische Expansion das diskursive Verhältnis zwischen Geldvertrauen und Zentralbanklegitimität grundlegend verändert haben.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Speaking to the people? Money, trust, and central bank legitimacy in the age of quantitative easing

Braun

2016

Review of International Political Economy

112

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“…The struggle between the two actors is a struggle with words, in which both journalists and central bankers want to manipulate markets with their communicative utterances, albeit in different and frequently opposing ways.' (Velthuis, 2015) A typical response to the characterisation of the media reports from economists is to suggest that journalists be further educated about monetary policy and inflation, without a critical assessment of the role of financial journalists as well as factors other than a lack of education that might result in media reports that differ substantially from the communication of the central bank.…”

Section: The Role Of the Journalists In The Expectations Channel Of Tmentioning

confidence: 99%

The role of financial journalists in the expectations channel of the monetary transmission mechanism

Reid

Siklos

Guetterman

et al. 2021

Research in International Business and Finance

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Monetary policy relies on managing the inflation expectations of the public in order to influence prices (inflation). Relying on the South African experience we argue that most of the general public are only exposed to the communication of the South African Reserve Bank (SARB) via the media. This state of affairs is fairly typical around the globe. We explore the role and biases of the journalists in transmitting the SARB's communication to the rationally inattentive general public. Our aim is to obtain insights about the factors that influence media articles that deal with monetary policy issues. Using interviews and qualitative content analysis, we explore the extent of the journalists' knowledge about inflation and monetary policy, their views concerning the credibility of the SARB, the sources of information they use, and the constraints and incentives they face in writing the articles.

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“…It was informed by the ideals of good governance and public accountability (Issing 2005), as well as the ideas of the New Monetary Consensus in the sense that policy transmission should be rational expectations prized. The rationale was that when central bank acts in a transparent, predictable, and precise manner, it reduces the uncertainty experienced by market actors and hence improves its ability to control inflationary expectations (Velthuis 2015).…”

Section: Institutional Legitimacy Of Central Bank Operationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Quantitative Easing Forever? Financialisation and the Institutional Legitimacy of the Federal Reserve’s Unconventional Monetary Policy

Ronkainen

Sorsa

2017

New Political Economy

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Scholars of financialisation have argued that the emergence of finance-led grow regimes requires new instruments for effective conduct of economic policy. In this scholarship, central banks have been seen as the most promising actors to utilise one of the most synergetic policies, the maintenance of high and stable prices of financial assets. Since the financial crisis of 2007-8, central banks of the developed world have adopted various unconventional monetary policy measures that serve this function. But will these unconventional measures become institutionally legitimate and institutionalised as conventional practice, as suggested necessary by scholars of financialisation? In this paper, we answer to this question by studying the institutional legitimation of the Federal Reserve's Quantiative Easing (QE) programmes. We argue that the QE programmes have been legitimated successfully but with institutional legitimation strategies, which cause institutional pressures that question the potential of QE from becoming a regular policy instrument and practice.

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Making monetary markets transparent: the European Central Bank's communication policy and its interactions with the media

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Cited by 35 publications

References 48 publications

Speaking to the people? Money, trust, and central bank legitimacy in the age of quantitative easing

Speaking to the people? Money, trust, and central bank legitimacy in the age of quantitative easing

The role of financial journalists in the expectations channel of the monetary transmission mechanism

Quantitative Easing Forever? Financialisation and the Institutional Legitimacy of the Federal Reserve’s Unconventional Monetary Policy

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