Making Inference across Mobilisation and Influence Research: Comparing Top-Down and Bottom-Up Mapping of Interest Systems

Abstract

Scholars of mobilisation and policy influence employ two quite different approaches to mapping interest group systems. Those interested in research questions on mobilisation typically rely on a bottom-up mapping strategy in order to characterise the total size and composition of interest group communities. Researchers with an interest in policy influence usually rely on a top-down strategy in which the mapping of politically active organisations depends on samples of specific policies. But some scholars also use top-down data gathered for other research questions on mobilisation (and vice versa). However, it is currently unclear how valid such large-N data for different types of research questions are. We illustrate our argument by addressing these questions using unique data sets drawn from the INTEREURO project on lobbying in the European Union and the European Union’s Transparency Register. Our findings suggest that top-down and bottom-up mapping strategies lead to profoundly different maps of interest group communities.

Organizing Transmission Belts: The Effect of Organizational Design on Interest Group Access to EU Policy‐making

“…Wonka et al compile interest groups from three different registers: European Parliament door pass holders (2008), the CONNECCS database (2007), and the commercial Landmarks European Public Affairs Directory (2007). The combination of these three registers provides an inclusive approach and offers a sample of EU-level interest groups that corrects for biases commonly associated with each of the individual databases (Berkhout and Lowery, 2010;Berkhout et al, 2017b). Wonka et al's (2010) compilation contains 681 EAs, which are required for the purpose of our analysis and we drew a random sample of 248 organizations, representing 36.4 per cent of this database.…”

“…The compilation dates from 2010, which could be problematic in terms of accurately depicting the current EU interest community. Yet, we know from recent studies that at the aggregate level, the EU interest system is quite stable (Berkhout et al, 2017b), while at the individual level we observe more volatility in terms of persistent versus ad hoc presence as indicated by Commission consultation and EU door pass registers (Berkhout and Lowery, 2011). We corrected for this individual-level volatility by using recent observations for the individual organizations.…”

Images of an Unbiased Interest System

“…And the European Commission has a strong preference for talking to only European-wide interests. However, research indicates that, at least for the latter, the distribution of different kinds of organizations active on major issues before the Commission is extremely similar to the distribution of all interests active in the more open European Parliament (Berkhout et al 2014). Finally, at the influence stage, access to especially powerful tactics by well-endowed organizations might discourage the less privileged from even trying.…”

Should I stay or should I go? Explaining variation in nonstate actor advocacy over time in global governance

“…Overall, we thus reject Hypothesis 3, which stated that business interests develop a steadier lobbying presence, but confirm Hypothesis 4 on the scope of representation. In light of research emphasizing the dominance of business groups in global governance (e.g., Berkhout et al, 2018;Berkhout & Lowery, 2011;Nordang-Uhre, 2014), this is an important finding. It indicates that, although business groups are on an aggregate level more active at the global level (compared to NGOs), they are also more likely to discontinue their efforts.…”

“…For instance, most of these studies have highlighted how NSAs from developed countries vastly outnumber NSAs from developing countries or the least developed countries active in IOs and in global governance more broadly (Beckfield, 2003;Hanegraaff, Braun, De Bièvre, & Beyers, 2015;Nordang-Uhre, 2014;Schroeder et al, 2012;Smith, 2005;Smith & Wiest, 2005;Steffek et al, 2007;Tallberg et al, 2013). Moreover, other mapping studies have highlighted how NSA participation in various IOs is largely a matter of business lobbying (Berkhout, Beyers, Braun, Hanegraaff, & Lowery, 2018;Berkhout, Hanegraaff, & Braun, 2017;Nordang-Uhre, 2014;Tallberg et al, 2013).…”