Making Hay with Actualism? The Need for a Realist Concept of Structure

Abstract

This article criticises the ontological assumptions outlined in Colin Hay's recent book Political Analysis (2002). It takes issue with Hay's interpretation of critical realism, in particular his reading of the work of Margaret Archer. Furthermore, it is suggested that Hay's understanding of the structure‐agency relationship contains weaknesses which have implications for both his theoretical and empirically‐based work. It is argued that a more robust concept of social structure may be required to support the kind of critical political analysis Hay aspires to.

Morphogenetic theory and the constructivist institutionalist challenge

“…Thirdly, Archer (), McAnulla () and Elder‐Vass () all point out that the concept of ‘ emergence ’ allows an ontological distinction (duality) to be theorised between structure and agency as causal forces, without falling into ontological dualism . As Elder‐Vass explains, emergence is the idea that “a whole [e.g.…”

“…However, in response to McAnulla (), Hay () offers a clarification of his position that would seem to defend Position 2 : “I certainly do not deny the existence of underlying mechanisms (structure‐agency complexes) which may be unobservable yet causally effective” (Hay, , p. 43). In Hay's view, these ‘mechanisms’ are “social processes (in which structure and agency are mutually implicated)”, while it is structure and agency themselves that are merely “analytical abstractions” (Hay, , p. 40).…”

Structure, agency and post-Fukushima nuclear policy: an alliance-context-actantiality model of political change

“…However, in avoiding the two sociologies trap, another challenge emerges when trying to assert a point of balance between these two positions. It is not enough to simply decide what proportions of each perspective should be incorporated, because to do so would require a full empirical knowledge of any given social event, and an unbiased metric for measuring the extent to which an action has agential or structural causes (McAnulla 2005;Hay and Wincott 1998).…”

‘Cabined, cribbed, confined, bound in’ or ‘we are not a government poodle’: Structure and agency in museums and galleries

“…This can be seen in both the large number of discussions of the ontological and epistemological bases underpinning possible understandings of the relationships between the two component elements of the debate (Hay & Wincott, 1998;Sibeon, 1999;Dowding, 2001, 97-100;Hay, 2002, 89-134;Lewis, 2002;McAnulla, 2005;Jessop, 2007;Hay, 2009aHay, , 2009bPleasants, 2009;Cruickshank, 2010), and in the increasing use of the structure-agency relationship as a means for undertaking forms of analysis of issues ranging from institutional racism (Wight, 2003), to democratisation in South Asia (Adeney & Wyatt, 2004), to local political participation (Lowndes et al, 2006) to British governance (Goodwin & Grix, 2011). These discussions may have their own intrinsic interest and, usually, lead to a clarification of the basic ground-rules under which substantive empirical analyses of the relationship of structure and agency can take place but they have generally been weak at developing the relationship between ontological and epistemological positions and the methodological consequences of them.…”