Maintaining System Stability

Abstract

This article examines the ways and degrees to which nation-states participate in and financially support United Nations peacekeeping operations (UN PKOs). The authors contend that UN PKOs are impure public goods whose provision conforms to expectations from public goods theory that deals with the provision of impure public goods and club goods, and much less to the hegemonic stability variant of the public goods approach. Conceptual arguments are followed by an examination of general patterns of UN PKOs, personnel and financial contributions to them, and the U.S. role in them. The authors conclude that the post-cold war period has seen a notable increase in the volume of provision of peacekeeping and in the quantity and diversity of contributors and beneficiaries. They recognize the difficulties posed by recent U.S. nonpayments and suggest the possibility of adjustments that will reestablish the financial basis that continuing substantial provision will require.

Trade Potential and UN Peacekeeping Participation

“…10 Normatively speaking, some countries send peacekeeping troops for winning a 'good citizen' reputation. 11 Then, there are economic motivations including financial reimbursements, 12 getting foreign aid from 'pivotal states', i.e. developed countries 13 and trade interests.…”

Only as fast as its troop contributors: Incentives, capabilities, and constraints in the UN’s peacekeeping response

“…Since reimbursement rates are the same for all TCCs – currently $1,428 per soldier per month – regardless of their economic situation or military expenditure, they are more attractive to some states than others. UN reimbursements are profitable only under restrictive conditions (Coleman & Nyblade, 2018) but are frequently highlighted as a key consideration for low- and middle-income TCCs (Bobrow & Boyer, 1997; Khanna, Sandler & Shimizu, 1998; Bove & Elia, 2011; Gaibulloev, Sandler & Shimizu, 2009). Qualitative evidence suggests that reimbursements matter for some states.…”

Globalization, Democratization, and the Prospects for Civil War in the New Millennium

“…Inherent in the decision to authorize peacekeeping operations is a collective action problem: under what conditions is it in the interest of the international community to intervene in a civil war in one of its member states? Bobrow and Boyer (1997) have assessed the incentives for different classes of nations to support and contribute to UN peacekeeping. Most nations will suffer no direct costs from civil wars in other nations.…”

“…However, authorization ultimately requires the consent—indeed the active support—of major powers. Bobrow and Boyer (1997:727) argue that major powers—including UN Security Council members—may benefit from “the maintenance of international and regional peace and stability,…the creation of environments more conducive to favored free and democratic elections,… stability for commercial and economic development interests in a region, and… a number of humanitarian goals ranging from food distribution to the management of refugee problems.” All too often, however, intervening in civil wars in Third World states offers no significant private benefits to major powers that would justify the costs and the risks (both to troops and to the electoral fortunes of leaders who commit their nation to the intervention). Given that major powers assume a substantial share of the costs of peacekeeping operations, and given that the expanded mandate of second‐generation peacekeeping involves a greater commitment of resources for a longer period of time, elected leaders of major powers have strong private incentives to withhold support for such missions.…”