Mainstreaming the non-state in bottom-up state-building: linkages between rebel governance and post-conflict legitimacy

Abstract

it examines the oft-neglected linkages between rebel governance and post-conflict legitimacy. Findings highlight three pitfalls of mainstreaming non-state roles without sufficient analysis of the sources of legitimacy underlying rebel governance frameworks. First, by drawing upon the functions and legitimacy of other non-state actors rather than the rebel group itself, an artificial image of state-building can be projected. Second, due to the fragmented and dispersed nature of legitimacy, the 'bottom-up' logic of state-building can prove dubious. Third, weak capacity in governance, and subcontracted sources of legitimacy, are likely to undermine the ability to develop independent structures and functions. Conclusions offer four case specific insights that can assist policy-makers in applying a more critical framework to the legitimacy of armed groups, before incorporating them into post-war governance arrangements. IntroductionExternally driven processes of state-building must decide between different types of nonstate actors as potential partners and justify the grounds for their selection. To find effective partners, state-builders must identify the source(s) of legitimacy of the different non-state groups. This article problematises the process of identifying legitimate political actors in contexts of institutional weakness and fragmented authority by focusing attention on the sources of legitimacy that are invoked by non-state actors as part of wartime governance arrangements. By addressing whether and how wartime governance practices and institutions developed under rebel governance administration may provide institutional raw material for state-building, it provides some key policy insights concerning the pitfalls of mainstreaming non-state roles without sufficient analysis of the sources of legitimacy of wartime governance frameworks. To demonstrate the linkages between different types of legitimacy invoked by non-state actors to sustain wartime governance arrangements, and their implications for post-conflict legitimacy, the article focuses on one type of non-state actor, i.e. rebel groups that have an intention to 'govern'. The article uses the case of the Sudan People's Liberation Army/ Movement's (SPLA/M) state-building efforts in South Sudan to examine two issues. First, how rebel groups interact with other types of non-state actors such as humanitarian aid agencies and local authorities or leaders in constructing their own legitimacy to rule; and second, the implications that fragmented sources of legitimacy might have for post-conflict stability. As a founding member of the G7 þ group of countries involved in implementing the New Deal on Engagement with Fragile and Conflict-Affected States, 1 South Sudan presents an important test case for exploring some of these policy relevant issues. Findings help explain how differences in the source of rebel group legitimacy can complicate their transition into stable political roles. Although the role of humanitarian actors and local traditional leadership are...

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