Macro‐ and micro‐level impacts of droughts: the case of the Zayandeh Rud river basin, Iran

Abstract

The irrigation sector is usually the first water user to be restricted in case of drought and agriculture is most affected. It is very important for water planners to better understand the relationship between a water deficit and agricultural performance in times of drought. This paper examines the 1999-2002 drought in the Zayandeh Rud basin, central Iran. It reviews the impact of dam management, the impact of supply reduction on water allocation and agricultural production, and examines the coping strategies used by farmers at the local level. It shows that although volumes diverted were greatly reduced (and were even zero in 2002) the impact on production was much less, due to a series of adjustment and massive substitution of groundwater for surface water.

The future of extreme climate in Iran

“…Lake Urmia - the largest lake in the Middle East and one of the world’s largest hypersaline lakes - has significantly shrunk 15 and given the status quo, it may completely dry up in 6–9 years 16 . Hamun lake in the east of Iran, Parishan and Shadegan lakes in the south 17,18 , and Zayandeh-Rud river in the center of Iran 19,20 are also at risk of disappearing due to mismanagement and climate change. Iran also has extremely critical conditions in groundwater resources because of overexploitation, and the country ranks among the top groundwater miners in the world 21 .…”

Cities vs. agriculture: A review of intersectoral water re‐allocation

“…Except for situations where irrigation holds ‘senior’ water rights and regulation is effective (Colby, 1993) 7 or where allocation to agriculture is not reduced in time (crops have already been planted), agriculture clearly stands at the losing end and has to relinquish its share first; shortages only affect domestic use secondarily (and partially), while industries are usually affected last (but many rely on groundwater). Evidence shows that instances of short‐term urban scarcity are thus due to a varying combination of extreme climatic events, lax management of inter‐annual security stocks, and insufficient preparedness, rather than to agriculture's lion's share (unless rigid water rights dictate otherwise) (Molle et al , 2007b; Del Moral Ituarte and Giansante, 2000).…”

Villains or heroes? Farmers' adjustments to water scarcity

“…Through these different coping strategies, many farmers have kept on producing even when no water was delivered. In the Abshar Left Bank command area, for instance, 30% of the area (10 000 ha) was kept in production in 2001-02 even though no irrigation water was delivered (Molle et al, 2008b). Informants in the field and at the water agency point out that groundwater use skyrocketed during the drought while groundwater tables fell, wells dried up, and farmers dug deeper and deeper wells in a frenzy, in a quest for water.…”

“…In the 1999-2001 period, the basin suffered a drastic drought analysed by Molle et al (2008b). Inflows to the dam were 53, 52 and 42% of the 1988-98 average for the three consecutive years, respectively.…”