Love: gloriously amoral and arational

Subject‐Relative Reasons for Love

“…Now, according to the no‐reasons theorist, no such property can plausibly be said to make love appropriate in the sense ordinary emotions are made appropriate. As a result, love is more akin to an urge or a sensation than to an emotion, a belief, or an action when it comes to its relation to justifying reasons: just as one's craving for food, or one's toothache, one's love for another person may sometimes be unfortunate, but it cannot be criticised as irrational (Frankfurt, , Smuts, ms., Zangwill, ). At best, therefore, love gives reasons to feel and act in certain ways, but it is not itself supported by reasons; just like toothaches and ice cream cravings, it can be given a causal explanation, but not a rationalizing one.…”

“…Contrary to ordinary emotions such as fear, admiration, and guilt, there may be nothing which makes love appropriate. Love, like hunger, is something we may just happen to have (Smuts, ms., Zangwill, ).…”

“…So, since love is not even supposed to be about the lovable, there is no circularity in the claim that being lovable is what makes love appropriate. In a recent paper (Zangwill, , 303‐305), Nick Zangwill argues that, if love is an evaluation (a view usually associated with extant reasons views), it is propositional. However, love is not propositional.…”

Reconciling Appraisal Love and Bestowal Love

“… 1 De Sousa, 2015, 75; Smuts, 2014a; Smuts, 2014b; Zangwill, 2013; Frankfurt, 2004; Frankfurt, 1999; Frankfurt, 1998; Singer, 1966. …”

Normative Reasons for Love, Part II

“…The view finds recent support in Kraut (, p. 417), Pitcher (, pp. 341–2), Singer (, p. 14), Shaffer (, p. 170), Thomas (), Frankfurt (1999b and 2004), Zangwill (), and Smuts (manuscript). Taylor (, p. 402) also suggests that the no‐reasons view is plausible.…”