Subject‐Relative Reasons for Love

Naar, Hichem

doi:10.1111/rati.12128

Cited by 14 publications

(6 citation statements)

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“…What is meant by merit here? As I argued elsewhere (Naar 2017), merit is constitutively related to a class of normative reasons that are tied to the nature of the response they favor. 55 Merit-based reasons for admiration, for instance, are those having to do with some good aspect of the object of one's emotion.…”

Section: The Action Analogy Better Captures Conflict With Belief and mentioning

confidence: 99%

Emotion: More like Action than Perception

Naar

2020

Erkenn

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Although some still advance reductive accounts of emotions—according to which they fall under a more familiar type of mental state—contemporary philosophers tend to agree that emotions probably constitute their own kind of mental state. Agreeing with this claim, however, is compatible with attempting to find commonalities between emotions and better understood things. According to the advocates of the so-called ‘perceptual analogy’, thinking of emotion in terms of perception can fruitfully advance our understanding even though emotion may not be reducible to ordinary perception. In this paper, I spell out and motivate a different analogy—that between emotion and action—an analogy which I think can do some important theoretical work. In particular, it constitutes a theoretically fruitful way to think about core aspects of emotions and might in fact be employed to provide a better account of certain aspects of emotions than the one based on the perceptual analogy. Emotions might not be a matter of seeing the world a certain way, but a matter of behaving internally in response to it. In a slogan form: Emotion is the inward counterpart of bodily movement.

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Section: The Action Analogy Better Captures Conflict With Belief and mentioning

confidence: 99%

Emotion: More like Action than Perception

Naar

2020

Erkenn

Self Cite

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“…Niko Kolodny (2003) argues that to love a person is to believe that one has a valuable type of relationship with them, for instance. More recent examples are Katy Abramson's and Adam Leite's (2011) view that love is a reactive emotion, or Hitchem Naar's (2017) view of love as based on subject-relative reasons.…”

Section: Relational Accountsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Irreplaceability and the Desire-Account of Love

Kreft

2022

Ethic Theory Moral Prac

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Lovers do not relate to their beloveds as seats of valuable qualities that would be replaceable for anyone with relevantly similar or more valuable qualities. Instead, lovers take their beloveds to be irreplaceable. This has been noted frequently in the current debate on love and different theories of love have offered different explanations for the phenomenon. In this paper, I develop a more complex picture of what is involved in lovers taking their beloveds to be irreplaceable. I argue that in order to account for the beloved’s irreplaceability, a theory of love must meet two conditions: it must explain the subjective aspect as well as the moral aspect of the beloved’s irreplaceability. I show that current theories of love fail to meet these conditions, either one or both of them, and I offer an alternative account that does - an account according to which love is understood as a special kind of desire for the beloved as a person. The aim of this paper is twofold: first, to give a more nuanced picture of the beloved’s irreplaceability, acknowledging in particular that there is a moral aspect to the phenomenon that has not been attended to thus far; second, to introduce and motivate a new desire-based account of love.

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“…If so, then love rationalism and actual romantic 8. For examples of the quality view, see Brogaard (2014), Delaney (1996), Naar (2017), Howard (2019, Jollimore (2011), andSolomon (2006). 9.…”

Section: A Trading Up Problem For the Rationalist Lovermentioning

confidence: 99%

Possessing Love’s Reasons: Or Why a Rationalist Lover Can Have a Normal Romantic Life

Lau

2021

Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy

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The rationalist lover accepts that whom she ought to love is whom she has most reason to love. She also accepts that the qualities of a person are reasons to love them. This seems to suggest that if the rationalist lover encounters someone with better qualities than her beloved, then she is rationally required to trade up. In this paper, I argue that this need not be the case and the rationalist lover can have just about as normal if not a better romantic life than anyone could hope for. This is because we often do possess most reason to love our beloveds. To see why this is so, we have to think more carefully about (i) how we come to possess reasons for love and (ii) the higher-order reasons that govern whether we should seek or refrain from possessing said reasons. Reflection on these issues leads to what I call the Possession-Commitment Account of Love’s Reasons. I use this account to address additional worries for love rationalism and highlight how being rational about love can potentially get us out of romantic messes. I conclude that if being a rationalist about love is plausible after all, then we have reason to hope that being rational about other areas of our practical lives is plausible as well.

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Subject‐Relative Reasons for Love

Cited by 14 publications

References 14 publications

Emotion: More like Action than Perception

Emotion: More like Action than Perception

Irreplaceability and the Desire-Account of Love

Possessing Love’s Reasons: Or Why a Rationalist Lover Can Have a Normal Romantic Life

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