Losing, but Accepting: Legitimacy, Positivity Theory, and the Symbols of Judicial Authority

Abstract

How is it that the U.S. Supreme Court is capable of getting most citizens to accept rulings with which they disagree? This analysis addresses the role of the symbols of judicial authority and legitimacy—the robe, the gavel, the cathedral‐like court building—in contributing to this willingness of ordinary people to acquiesce to disagreeable court decisions. Using an experimental design and a nationally representative sample, we show that exposure to judicial symbols (1) strengthens the link between institutional support and acquiescence among those with relatively low prior awareness of the Supreme Court, (2) has differing effects depending upon levels of preexisting institutional support, and (3) severs the link between disappointment with a disagreeable Court decision and willingness to challenge the ruling. Since symbols influence citizens in ways that reinforce the legitimacy of courts, the connection between institutional attitudes and acquiescence posited by Legitimacy Theory is both supported and explained.

Naming Names: The Impact of Supreme Court Opinion Attribution on Citizen Assessment of Policy Outcomes

“…One attribution approach is to characterize the decision as merely coming “from the Supreme Court” without providing additional context about which particular justice authored the opinion. By crediting the institution with the decision this approach would seem to garner greater acceptance of the decision by members of the public by connoting neutrality, credibility, clarity, legality, and even institutional legitimacy (Baird ; Bartels and Mutz ; Brigham ; Gibson et al ; Hoekstra ; Mondak ). This general deference to and reverence of the U.S. High Court (and its actions) has been described as “positivity theory” (e.g., Gibson ).…”

“…Specifically, we are interested in whether citizens' agreement with a decision by the Court is affected by source cues tied to the identity of the majority opinion author. We argue that majority opinions attributed to the U.S. Supreme Court as a whole should enjoy higher levels of agreement than those attributed to particular justices because the Court‐attributed opinions will connote neutrality, credibility, and institutional legitimacy (Bartels and Mutz ; Gibson et al ; Hoekstra ).…”

Naming Names: The Impact of Supreme Court Opinion Attribution on Citizen Assessment of Policy Outcomes

“…Central to this debate is the question of how the public actually processes output from the Court (Johnston et al 2014). Given that legitimacy is most important for those who do not agree with the Court's decisions (Gibson 2012;Gibson et al 2014) and can impact implementation (Canon and Johnson 1984), it becomes important to understand what factors influence public agreement with the specific decisions of the Court.…”

“…Specifically, we are interested in whether citizens' agreement with a decision by the Court is affected by source cues tied to the identity of the majority opinion author. We argue that majority opinions attributed to the U.S. Supreme Court as a whole should enjoy higher levels of agreement than those attributed to particular justices because the Court-attributed opinions will connote neutrality, credibility, and institutional legitimacy (Bartels and Mutz 2009;Gibson et al 2014;Hoekstra 1995).…”

The Two Opposing Effects of Judicial Elections on Legitimacy Perceptions

“…Positivity theory (Gibson and Caldeira 2009b;Gibson, Lodge, and Woodson 2014) emphasizes how knowledge of courts changes the manner in which people evaluate them. If this same dynamic appears with election activity, individual-level characteristics like court awareness may moderate the effect of election activity.…”