The Two Opposing Effects of Judicial Elections on Legitimacy Perceptions

Abstract

Judicial elections have two opposing effects on legitimacy perceptions for state supreme courts. Elections not only provide a boost to legitimacy through the chance to hold officials accountable but also involve campaign activity that decreases legitimacy perceptions. This article examines these two opposing effects using a nationally representative survey that includes items assessing diffuse support for state supreme courts. It uses multiple indicators to differentiate between states with highly active election systems involving large amounts of campaign activity and states with less active elections systems that involve little campaign activity. The results from the survey show that the legitimacy of elected courts is higher than appointed courts but only in states with little election activity. In states with high amounts of election activity, the legitimacy of elected courts is lower than appointed courts.

Judging Judicial Review in the American States

“…If the public is equally likely to punish a court regardless of the level of majority support for a bill, strategic docketing of cases may be an unnecessary action for courts to take. Moreover, given that the public punishes courts for appearing political (Gibson and Nelson 2017; Hansford, Intawan, and Nicholson 2018; Woodson 2017), such strategic case selection may only magnify the negative consequences of the Court’s eventual use of judicial review if the public views it as political in nature.…”

“…This project has important implications for the burgeoning literature on the consequences of judicial elections for public opinion toward judicial institutions (e.g., Benesh 2006; Cann and Yates 2016; Gibson 2012; Woodson 2017). In particular, given that decisions of appointed judges appear to be accepted by the public at lower rates, overall, our results provide a powerful counterargument to claims made by judicial reform groups (e.g., Brennan Center for Justice 2010) that judicial elections have deleterious effects on the esteem in which the public holds judicial institutions.…”

“…Because the states use a mixture of electoral and appointive methods of judicial selection and retention, these courts have a unique relationship with public support: aside from any relationship between performance satisfaction and public support for their court , most state judges need it to keep their jobs. Noting this unique relationship, scholars have shown renewed interest in untangling the relationship between judicial elections and public support for judicial institutions (e.g., Benesh 2006; Cann and Yates 2016; Gibson 2012; Woodson 2017).…”

“…For dissenting views, see Benesh (2006) and Cann and Yates (2008; 2016). As an example of the nuance, Woodson (2017) demonstrates that, generally, judicial legitimacy is higher in states that use judicial elections; however, campaign activity can detract from legitimacy such that states that have vigorous judicial campaigns have less public support than states that do not use judicial elections.…”

Diversity and Power: Selection Method and Its Impacts on State Executive Descriptive Representation

“…Looking at the impact of selection method on bureaucrats, elected bureaucrats are more likely to promote policies that are congruent with public opinion, but appointed bureaucrats tend to be more accurate and evaluated higher for their work (Krause, Lewis, and Douglas 2006; Lewis 2007; Miller 2012). In addition, in the case of state supreme courts, elected courts are viewed by citizens as more legitimate than appointed ones (Woodson 2017).…”