Logical realism

Rush, Penelope

doi:10.1017/cbo9781139626279.003

Cited by 10 publications

(5 citation statements)

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“…Na filosofia da lógica, o debate entre realismo e antirrealismo costuma ocorrer em torno da existência independente de fatos lógicos, bem como da existência de uma única ou várias lógicas verdadeiras. Rush (2014), por exemplo, caracteriza o realismo lógico como a crença de que fatos lógicos são independentes de qualquer atividade humana, de modo que os fatos são como são, independentemente dos seres humanos compreenderem ou não sua existência. Priest (2014), por sua vez, centra a sua posição realista sob a crença de que existem fatos lógicos.…”

Section: Sobre Realismos E Antirrealismosunclassified

Antirrealismo e Expressivismo Lógico

Ferreira

Silva

2021

Principia

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Em sua obra, Robert Brandom apresenta uma teoria expressivista da lógica. Segundo o autor, a lógica tem o papel expressivo de tornar explı́citas as relações inferenciais implı́citas em nossas práticas linguı́sticas. Estas relações inferenciais conferem conteúdo aos conceitos. Neste artigo, exploraremos a tese de que o expressivismo lógico de Brandom é uma teoria antirrealista acerca da lógica. Realistas lógicos costumam defender a existência independente de fatos lógicos em relação a nossas práticas cognitivas e linguı́sticas, de modo que a lógica, uma vez que seria capaz de representar estes fatos, descreveria verdadeiramente a estrutura da realidade. Por contraste, antirrealistas lógicos não se comprometem com a existência independente de fatos lógicos para entenderem a natureza da lógica. Em contraste com uma visão realista, mostramos que o antirrealismo de Brandom tem como consequências uma ontologia simples e econômica e a fundação de uma alternativa pragmatista para se examinar a normatividade da lógica, o fenômeno da pluralidade de lógicas rivais e a natureza de nossa racionalidade.

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Section: Sobre Realismos E Antirrealismosunclassified

Antirrealismo e Expressivismo Lógico

Ferreira

Silva

2021

Principia

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“…Second, there is a parallel (indeed, perhaps more than a parallel-perhaps the two theses are intimately entwined) between logical realism and what I will call 'mathematical realism' (where that is 18 Recent discussions of (but not necessarily endorsements of!) realism include Almog (1989), Berto (2015, LaPointe (2014), Maddy (2014), McSweeney (2019a, 2020b, Tahko (2009Tahko ( , 2019, Rush (2014), Raven (2020), Sher (2011), Sider (2011. The status of a definition of logical realism in the literature is messy, and the boundaries are unclear.…”

Section: Logical Realismmentioning

confidence: 99%

The cost of closure: logical realism, anti-exceptionalism, and theoretical equivalence

McSweeney

2021

Synthese

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It is commonly assumed by philosophers of science that logically equivalent theories are in fact theoretically equivalent. I argue that two theses, anti-exceptionalism about logic (which says, roughly, that logic is not a priori, that it is revisable, and that it is not special or set apart from other human inquiry) and logical realism (which says, roughly, that differences in logic reflect genuine metaphysical differences in the world), make trouble for both this commitment and the closely related commitment to theories being closed under logical consequence. I provide three arguments. The first two show that anti-exceptionalism about logic provides an epistemic challenge to both the closure and the equivalence claims; the third shows that logical realism provides a metaphysical challenge to both the closure and the equivalence claims. Along the way, I show that there are important methodological upshots for metaphysicians and philosophers of logic. In particular, there are lessons to be drawn about certain conceptions of naturalism as constraining the possibilities for metaphysics and the philosophy of logic.

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“…(E.g. Rush () Tahko ().) I don't put things this way in order to accommodate the view that (i) it is a category mistake to think that logic is in the mind‐and‐language independent world (if one thinks that logic has to do with linguistic entities and the relations between them, and that linguistic entities are not in the mind‐and‐language independent world), but (ii) the reason that it is correct to use a certain logic to describe the world is that the logic conforms to the structure of the world.…”

Section: Metaphysical Logical Realism and The “One True Logic”mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Resnik () and Lapointe () each discuss the merits of a principle of independence: that the logical truths are true independent of our minds/language. Rush () explores a conception of logical realism on which logic is about independently existing structures . This view, in part, helps motivate the idea that logical realism can do work for us in the same way that mathematical realism does.…”

Section: Metaphysical Logical Realism and The “One True Logic”mentioning

confidence: 99%

Logical Realism and the Metaphysics of Logic

McSweeney

2018

Philosophy Compass

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Logical Realism' is taken to mean many different things. I argue that if reality has a privileged structure, then a view I call metaphysical logical realism is true. The view says that, first, there is 'One True Logic'; second, that the One True Logic is made true by the mind-and-language-independent world; and third, that the mind-and-language-independent world makes it the case that the One True Logic is better than any other logic at capturing the structure of reality.Along the way, I discuss a few alternatives, and clarify two distinct kinds of metaphysical logical realism.

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Logical realism

Cited by 10 publications

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Antirrealismo e Expressivismo Lógico

Antirrealismo e Expressivismo Lógico

The cost of closure: logical realism, anti-exceptionalism, and theoretical equivalence

Logical Realism and the Metaphysics of Logic

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