Logical Analysis of Hash Functions

Jovanović, Dejan; Janicic, Predrag

doi:10.1007/11559306_11

Cited by 21 publications

(21 citation statements)

References 7 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…First is the solution proposed in [16] where the main idea is to change the behaviour of all the arithmetic and logical operators that the algorithm uses, in such a way that each operator produces a propositional formula corresponding to the operation performed. It is obtained by using C++ implementation and a feature of the C++ language called operator overloading.…”

Section: A Toolkit For Cnf Formula Generationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Security Margin Evaluation of SHA-3 Contest Finalists through SAT-Based Attacks

Homsirikamol

Morawiecki

Rogawski

et al. 2012

Computer Information Systems and Industrial Management

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Part 2: Security, Access Control and Intrusion DetectionInternational audienceIn 2007, the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) announced a public contest aiming at the selection of a new standard for a cryptographic hash function. In this paper, the security margin of five SHA-3 finalists is evaluated with an assumption that attacks launched on finalists should be practically verified. A method of attacks is called logical cryptanalysis where the original task is expressed as a SATisfiability problem. To simplify the most arduous stages of this type of cryptanalysis and helps to mount the attacks in a uniform way a new toolkit is used. In the context of SAT-based attacks, it has been shown that all the finalists have substantially bigger security margin than the current standards SHA-256 and SHA-1

show abstract

Section: A Toolkit For Cnf Formula Generationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Security Margin Evaluation of SHA-3 Contest Finalists through SAT-Based Attacks

Homsirikamol

Morawiecki

Rogawski

et al. 2012

Computer Information Systems and Industrial Management

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…This was done for a wide variety of cryptographic primitives, some of which are DES, MD4/5, Trivium, AES and Keccak [35,21,13,23,40]. One of the tools used in this area is CryptoMiniSat [47].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Analysis of Boomerang Differential Trails via a SAT-Based Constraint Solver URSA

Kircanski¹

2015

Applied Cryptography and Network Security

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

In order to obtain differential patterns over many rounds of a cryptographic primitive, the cryptanalyst often needs to work on local differential trail analysis. Examples include merging two differential trail parts into one or, in the case of boomerang and rectangle attacks, connecting two short trails within the quartet boomerang setting. In the latter case, as shown by Murphy in 2011, caution should be exercised as there is increased chance of running into contradictions in the middle rounds of the primitive. In this paper, we propose the use of a SAT-based constraint solver URSA as aid in analysis of differential trails and find that previous rectangle/boomerang attacks on XTEA and SHACAL-1 block ciphers and SM3 hash function are based on incompatible trails. Given the C specification of the cryptographic primitive, verifying differential trail portions requires minimal work on the side of the cryptanalyst.

show abstract

“…Previous work [12] proposed an elegant SAT instance generation method based on C++ operator overloading. The source code of each operator ( ,_,etc.)…”

Section: Encoding Zuc As a Sat Instance And Experimental Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Unlike [12], we use the Tseitin transformations to express each operator directly in CNF, and use operator overloading to append these clauses directly to a file in DIMACS format. This makes the encoding of ZUC e cient since it requires no additional memory or computations to handle the formula.…”

Section: Encoding Zuc As a Sat Instance And Experimental Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

SAT based analysis of LTE stream cipher ZUC

Lafitte

Markowitch

Heule

2013

Proceedings of the 6th International Conference on Security of Information and Networks

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Mobile security is of paramount importance. The security of LTE (long term evolution of radio networks), which is currently widely deployed as a long-term standard for mobile networks, relies upon three cryptographic primitives, among which the stream cipher ZUC. In this paper, we point out that the linear feedback shift register (LFSR) used in ZUC has about 2 25 encodings of the zero state (i.e. all LFSR variables are 0) due to the fact that operations are performed modulo 2 31 1 on 32-bit operands. We use SAT solvers to show that these states are reachable when 64 bits of ZUC's initial state can be chosen (i.e. R1, R2). That is, for each key there are many initial vectors that lead to a weak state after ZUC's initialization. We also use SAT-solvers to disprove the existence of such weak inputs when the initial values of R1, R2 are set to zero as required by the o cial specifications. Finally, we discuss how the redundancy introduced in ZUC's output function might help mounting SAT-solver based guess-and-determine attacks given a few keystream digits.

show abstract

Logical Analysis of Hash Functions

Cited by 21 publications

References 7 publications

Security Margin Evaluation of SHA-3 Contest Finalists through SAT-Based Attacks

Security Margin Evaluation of SHA-3 Contest Finalists through SAT-Based Attacks

Analysis of Boomerang Differential Trails via a SAT-Based Constraint Solver URSA

SAT based analysis of LTE stream cipher ZUC

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About