Locke's Moral Man

LoLordo, Antonia

doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199652778.001.0001

Cited by 47 publications

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“…Where there is no Property, there is no Injustice , is a Proposition as certain as any Demonstration in Euclid : For the Idea of Property , being a right to any thing; and the Idea to which the name Injustice is given, being the invasion or Violation of that right; it is evident, that these Ideas being thus established, and these Names annexed to them, I can as certainly know this Proposition to be true, as that a Triangle has three Angles equal to two right ones. Again, No Government allows absolute Liberty : The Idea of Government being the establishment of Society upon certain Rules or Laws, which require Conformity to them and the Idea of absolute Liberty being for any one to do whatever he pleases; I am as capable of being certain of the Truth of this Proposition, as of any in Mathematicks.After quoting this passage LoLordo claims, “The idea of ourselves ‘as understanding, rational creatures’: this is the idea of a person …” (2012, 84). LoLordo is exactly right about that.…”

Section: Arguments Against a Mode Interpretationmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Locke on the Ontology of Persons

Gordon‐Roth¹

2015

The Southern J of Philosophy

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The importance of John Locke's discussion of persons is undeniable. Locke never explicitly tells us whether he thinks persons are substances or modes, however. We are thus left in the dark about a fundamental aspect of Locke's view. Many commentators have recently claimed that Lockean persons are modes. In this paper I swim against the current tide in the secondary literature and argue that Lockean persons are substances. Specifically I argue that what Locke says about substance, power, and agency commits him to the claim that persons are substances. I consider the passages mode interpreters cite and show why these passages do not imply that Lockean persons are modes. I also respond to two objections anyone who thinks Lockean persons are substances must address. I show that a substance reading of Locke on persons can be sympathetic and viable. I contend that with a clearer understanding of the ontological status of Lockean persons we can gain a firmer grasp of what Locke's picture of persons looks like. Finally, once we are armed with a better understanding of Locke on substance, mode, and personhood, we can pave the way toward a more nuanced description of the early modern debate over personal identity.

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Section: Arguments Against a Mode Interpretationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…These include Antonia LoLordo ( and ), Udo Thiel ( and ), William Uzgalis (), Ruth Mattern (), and arguably Galen Strawson () though this interpretation can be traced back to Edmund Law ().…”

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confidence: 99%

Locke on the Ontology of Persons

Gordon‐Roth¹

2015

The Southern J of Philosophy

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“…Those who give Immaterial/Material Substance readings include C.D. Broad (), Harold Noonan (), William Uzgalis (), Antonia LoLordo (, ), Udo Thiel (), D. Kenneth Brown (), Matthew Stuart (2013), Martha Brandt Bolton (), and Edwin McCann (draft, 2014)…”

Section: A Taxonomy Of Interpretationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…LoLordo () makes a similar point but cashes it out in terms of ‘thinking substance’ and ‘material substance’ (85–94). Perhaps this is to capture Locke's agnosticism regarding substance dualism.…”

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confidence: 99%

Locke's Place‐Time‐Kind Principle

Gordon‐Roth

2015

Philosophy Compass

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John Locke discusses the notions of identity and diversity in Book 2, Chapter 27 of An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. At the beginning of this much-discussed chapter, Locke posits the place-time-kind principle. According to this principle, no two things of the same kind can be in the same place at the same time (2.27.1). Just what Locke means by this is unclear, however. So too is whether this principle causes problems for Locke, and whether these problems can be resolved. This is significant because the placetime-kind principle is foundational to Locke's discussion of identity. Moreover, the place-time-kind principle stands at the center of a number of lively and long-standing debates in Locke scholarship. These include the debates over the ontological status of Lockean persons, and whether Locke is a relative identity theorist, to name just two. In this paper, I offer a survey of how Locke's place-time-kind principle has been interpreted in the secondary literature. The aim of this taxonomy is to clarify where the differences between competing interpretations lie, and additionally show just how challenging it is to determine which reading is best.

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“…I am taking onboard the view that consciousness, for Locke, is a form of self‐consciousness intrinsic to every mental state. Versions of this interpretation are found in Weinberg, ; Coventry and Kriegel, ; Jorgensen, ; Thiel, ; and LoLordo, .…”

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confidence: 95%

Locke on Knowing Our Own Ideas (and Ourselves)

Weinberg

2015

Pacific Philosophical Qtr

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Locke defines knowledge as the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas. Nevertheless, he claims that we know particular things: the identity of our ideas, our own existence, and the existence of external objects. Although much has been done to reconcile the definition of knowledge with our knowledge of external objects, there is virtually nothing in the scholarship when it comes to knowing ideas or our own existence. I fill in this gap by arguing that perceptions of ideas are complex mental states that convey propositional knowledge due to agreeing elements therein.

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Locke's Moral Man

Cited by 47 publications

References 0 publications

Locke on the Ontology of Persons

Locke on the Ontology of Persons

Locke's Place‐Time‐Kind Principle

Locke on Knowing Our Own Ideas (and Ourselves)

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