Locke's Externalism about ‘Sensitive Knowledge’

Wilson, Aaron B.

doi:10.1080/09608788.2014.918023

Cited by 4 publications

(7 citation statements)

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“…In my view, Descartes also thinks 3. For an externalist interpretation of Descartes, see Della Rocca (2005) and Loeb (2010); for Locke, see Bolton (2004), Wilson (2014), and Rockwood (2016; for Hume, see Kemp Smith (1905), Wolterstorff (1996), Loeb (2002) and (2010), Beebee (2006), andSchmitt (2014).…”

Section: Descartes On Justificationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Internalism and Externalism in Early Modern Epistemology

Rockwood

2024

Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy

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Do Descartes, Locke, and Hume have an internalist or externalist view of epistemic justification? Internalism is, roughly, the view that a belief that p is justified by a mental state, such as the awareness of evidence. By contrast, externalism is, roughly, the view that a belief that p is justified by facts about the belief-forming process, such as the reliability of the belief-forming process. I argue that they all think that the awareness of evidence is required for justification, but none of them think that the awareness of evidence alone is sufficient for justification. Similarly, I argue that they all think that reliability of the belief-forming process is required for justification, but none of them think reliability alone is sufficient for justification. So, neither a fully internalist position nor a fully externalist position adequately captures their views of justification; rather, both the supporting evidence and the reliability of the belief-forming process explain why we should hold those beliefs, and hence explain why those beliefs are justified. Thus, they each have a partly internalist, partly externalist view of justification. 

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Section: Descartes On Justificationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Internalism and Externalism in Early Modern Epistemology

Rockwood

2024

Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy

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“…We might want to ask whether we can know that there really exists a sun as the cause of the idea. But we have good evidence in the fact that we experience the idea 24 For example, Allen (2013), Marušić (2016), Nagel (2016), Owen (2008), Priselac (2017), Rockwood (2013), Weinberg (2013Weinberg ( , 2016, and Wilson (2014), (to mention a few) see sensitive knowledge as a form of knowledge rather than probable judgment. Newman (2007) argues that sensitive knowledge includes both kinds of cognitive acts.…”

Section: Miracles and Sensitive Knowledgementioning

confidence: 99%

“…I think the very broad-brushed account I am giving in this paper might still be consistent with Rickless in that he argues that an instance of sensitive knowledge is still the perception of a true proposition even if it doesn't count as knowledge. 25 More recently, for example, Allen (2013), Marušić (2016), Nagel (2016, Newman (2007), Owen (2008), Priselac (2017, Rickless (2008Rickless ( , 2015, Weinberg (2013), and Wilson (2014. 26 See note 25.…”

Section: Miracles and Sensitive Knowledgementioning

confidence: 99%

“…26 See note 25. 27 For example, Allen (2013), Nagel (2016, Owen (2008), Priselac (2017), Weinberg (2013), and Wilson (2014. 28 Nagel (2016), Newman (2007), Priselac (2017), and Weinberg (2013 address the role of these arguments.…”

Section: Miracles and Sensitive Knowledgementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Those arguments point to our ability to be affected by the senses (IV.xi.4), the passivity of the senses (IV.xi.5), the fact that a sense experience is often 29 This does not preclude that having sensitive knowledge may include the meeting of some sort of externalist justificatory condition as well. Wilson (2014) has what he calls a "hybrid" view. Nagel (2016), Newman (2007), and Weinberg (2016) add an externalist semantic condition to what is essentially an internalist account.…”

Section: Miracles and Sensitive Knowledgementioning

confidence: 99%

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Locke's Natural and Religious Epistemology

Weinberg¹

2020

Journal of the History of Philosophy

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In this paper, I am outlining a new, and perhaps controversial, account of Locke's epistemology. The common denominator in any act of assent in both the natural and religious epistemologies is the regulating role of reason. Key to the regulating role of reason is the requirement that any cognitive achievement, whether of knowledge, probability, or matter of faith, meets epistemic conditions at different stages or from different points of view. By employing the same justificatory structure throughout his epistemology, Locke offers a way in which reason can be seen to go as far as it can to justify itself (its reliability as well as its scope) from within its own natural limitations.

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Wiele twarzy konceptualizmu

Kozak

2018

Diametros

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Locke's Externalism about ‘Sensitive Knowledge’

Cited by 4 publications

References 11 publications

Internalism and Externalism in Early Modern Epistemology

Internalism and Externalism in Early Modern Epistemology

Locke's Natural and Religious Epistemology

Wiele twarzy konceptualizmu

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