Abstract:In this paper, I am outlining a new, and perhaps controversial, account of Locke's epistemology. The common denominator in any act of assent in both the natural and religious epistemologies is the regulating role of reason. Key to the regulating role of reason is the requirement that any cognitive achievement, whether of knowledge, probability, or matter of faith, meets epistemic conditions at different stages or from different points of view. By employing the same justificatory structure throughout his episte… Show more
“…The standard reading of Locke's view of miracles is that he was a subjectivist. Ayers (1993), Nuovo (2002), Mooney and Imbrosciano (2005), Flew (2006), Weinberg (2020), Rockwood (2018, 2021) all defend such a position. A key piece of evidence each scholar points to is the definition Locke provides of miracles in the Discourse ,A Miracle then I take to be a sensible Operation, which, being above the comprehension of the Spectator, and in his Opinion contrary to the establish'd Course of Nature, is taken by him to be Divine.…”
Section: The Subjectivist Interpretationmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In a more recent article, Shelley Weinberg writes, “Immediately noticeable is that Locke's definition is entirely subjective. Whether a sensible event counts as a miracle depends on whether it is taken to be one by the person witnessing the event” (Weinberg, 2020, p. 253).…”
Section: The Subjectivist Interpretationmentioning
Locke's definition of miracles in “A Discourse of Miracles” is widely cited by scholars as evidence of his subjectivism on the matter. According to this interpretation, Locke held it to be sufficient that an event seems to be a violation of the laws of nature for it to count as a miracle. Nothing supernatural need actually occur. The principal aim of this article is to argue that Locke can and ought to be read as an objectivist about miracles. A subjectivist reading falls short in two crucial respects: It undermines the function of miracles as evidence for divine revelation, so central to his account, and is at odds with his consistent and explicitly objective use of the term, as an event that necessarily involves a violation of the laws of nature. Indeed, it is from their objective nature that Locke thinks miracles derive their evidential force. A key part of my argument lies in distinguishing between ontological and epistemological issues concerning miracles and demonstrating how this distinction is present throughout his work on the matter. Ultimately, I conclude that what is often interpreted as Locke's subjectivism about miracles is his privileging of these epistemic issues.
“…The standard reading of Locke's view of miracles is that he was a subjectivist. Ayers (1993), Nuovo (2002), Mooney and Imbrosciano (2005), Flew (2006), Weinberg (2020), Rockwood (2018, 2021) all defend such a position. A key piece of evidence each scholar points to is the definition Locke provides of miracles in the Discourse ,A Miracle then I take to be a sensible Operation, which, being above the comprehension of the Spectator, and in his Opinion contrary to the establish'd Course of Nature, is taken by him to be Divine.…”
Section: The Subjectivist Interpretationmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In a more recent article, Shelley Weinberg writes, “Immediately noticeable is that Locke's definition is entirely subjective. Whether a sensible event counts as a miracle depends on whether it is taken to be one by the person witnessing the event” (Weinberg, 2020, p. 253).…”
Section: The Subjectivist Interpretationmentioning
Locke's definition of miracles in “A Discourse of Miracles” is widely cited by scholars as evidence of his subjectivism on the matter. According to this interpretation, Locke held it to be sufficient that an event seems to be a violation of the laws of nature for it to count as a miracle. Nothing supernatural need actually occur. The principal aim of this article is to argue that Locke can and ought to be read as an objectivist about miracles. A subjectivist reading falls short in two crucial respects: It undermines the function of miracles as evidence for divine revelation, so central to his account, and is at odds with his consistent and explicitly objective use of the term, as an event that necessarily involves a violation of the laws of nature. Indeed, it is from their objective nature that Locke thinks miracles derive their evidential force. A key part of my argument lies in distinguishing between ontological and epistemological issues concerning miracles and demonstrating how this distinction is present throughout his work on the matter. Ultimately, I conclude that what is often interpreted as Locke's subjectivism about miracles is his privileging of these epistemic issues.
“…Since there is equal and opposite evidence for each of their claims for divine authority, there is no more reason to believe one over the other. So, as Shelley Weinberg (2020, 258) explains, we ‘begin to reflectively question whether . .…”
Section: The Competing Miracles Objectionmentioning
Christian apologists argue that the testimony of the miracles of Jesus provide evidence for Christianity. Hume tries to undermine this argument by pointing out that miracles are said to occur in other religious traditions and so miracles do not give us reason to believe in Christianity over the alternatives. Thus, competing miracles act as an undercutting defeater for the argument from miracles for Christianity. Yet, before Hume, Locke responds to this kind of objection, and in this article I explain and defend his response. In short, Locke argues that God will ensure that there is more evidence for Christianity (if true) and this greater evidence is an undercutting defeater for Hume's competing miracles defeater (i.e. it is a defeater-defeater). If so, then, as Locke argues, competing miracles do not weaken the evidence from miracles for Christianity.
According to some of the past half-century’s most influential critics of liberalism, John Locke is the pivotal subverter of the pre-modern ethical tradition. Locke’s view of nature and of human nature, the story goes, divorced ethics from natural teleology and so set off an inevitable spiral downward into moral dissolution. This story about Locke remains influential even though the last fifty years of Locke scholarship have brought a cascade of studies treating Locke as operating within the tradition of Reformed natural law. These studies, in part because they embrace a distorted view of Locke’s conception of the person, have failed to address satisfactorily the crux of the story told by the critics of liberalism. This article corrects that distortion and demonstrates how natural teleology operates within Locke’s ethics. I show how Locke sought to identify the teleological ordering of human beings to the supreme good by developing a relational conception of the person, analysing the human being as embedded in and defined by a web of relationships including neighbour and God. The result is a Locke far more in continuity with pre-modern ethical approaches than has hitherto been realized, one who sought to preserve natural teleology for the modern world.
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