Locke on Sensitive Knowledge and the Veil of Perception – Four Misconceptions1

Abstract

Interpreters of Locke's Essay are divided over whether to attribute to him a Representational Theory of Perception (RTP). Those who object to an RTP interpretation cite (among other things) Locke's Book IV account of sensitive knowledge, contending that the account is incompatible with RTP. The aim of this paper is to rebut this kind of objection -to defend an RTP reading of the relevant Book IV passages. Specifically, I address four influential assumptions (about sensitive knowledge) cited by opponents of an RTP interpretation and argue that in each case the assumption is false.

Locke on Sensitive Knowledge as Knowledge1

“…Adverting to his earlier paper (Newman, 2004, pp. 276–282), Newman assumes a “between‐ideas” understanding of the definition of knowledge: when Locke says that knowledge is the perception of the agreement of ideas he means an agreement between two ideas, rather than between an idea and something else 12 .…”

“…3 3 This way of stating the minimal commitments of a representational theory of perception is taken from Newman (2004, p. 273). Newman argues that the conformity of ideas to their external causes in veridical sensory perception must not be understood as a relation of resemblance , but of indication : ideas ‘conform’ to their causes by indicating them (much as smoke indicates fire) (Newman, 2004, p. 292). That seems right to me as a generic account of the way that ideas of sensation conform to their external causes (by indicating them).…”

Locke on Knowing Our Own Ideas (and Ourselves)

“…First, one might wonder whether I have actually succeeded in showing that intuitive knowledge of our own ideas is consistent with Locke's definition of knowledge. For example, Newman (, ) argues that knowledge, for Locke, consists only in a perception of an agreement between two ideas. Rickless (, p. 86) cites the following passage from IV.i.5 as the most persuasive of the same claim, since it seems to say that there is ‘no room’ for any kind of agreement that is not between two ideas: ‘There could be no room for any positive Knowledge at all, if we could not perceive any Relation between our Ideas , and find out the Agreement or Disagreement, they have one with another, in several ways the Mind takes of comparing them.’ I don't think we have to see the interpretation I have offered as conflicting with these passages.…”

“…In II.xxxiii.19, we find, ‘… our Knowledge, which all consists in Propositions’; in the Correspondence with Stillingfleet (Locke, , iv: 357), he says, ‘Everything which we either know or believe, is some proposition,’ and ‘… certainty of knowledge is to perceive the agreement or disagreement of any ideas, as expressed in any proposition’ (iv: 118). In addition, in the IV.v.1 definition of truth, Locke is clear that the ‘joining or separating of Signs’ whose agreement or disagreement constitutes truth ‘is what by another name, we call Proposition.’ For some of the secondary literature espousing this view see, for example, Ruth Mattern ( [1998]), David Soles (), Lex Newman, (, ), Samuel C. Rickless (), and Jennifer Nagel (in press) for interpretations of Locke's theory of knowledge and especially of sensitive knowledge that emphasize the propositional nature of knowledge.…”

Two Kinds of Intentionality in Locke

“…23 23 When Locke denies that ideas of whiteness and coldness are ‘the Images, or Representations of what does exist’ (2.30.2:372), he is using these terms to mean what he earlier expressed by ‘Images and Resemblances ’ (2.8.7:134). See Newman, 2004, p. 300 n39, and Locke's confirmation in Locke, 1697/1823, pp. 168–71/vol.…”