Load cell monitoring in Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plants: Potentialities for improved safeguard verifications

Carchon, R.; Dechamp, Luc; Eklund, Lars; Janssens, W.; Mercurio, Giuseppe; Puppa, Paolo; Patrice, Richir

doi:10.1016/j.nucengdes.2010.10.038

Cited by 3 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 1 publication

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“…The concerns are overproduction of low enriched uranium (LEU) or illicit production of highly enriched uranium (HEU) (Carchon et al, 2011). Overproduction of LEU could suggest intent to enrich to HEU at another facility/state.…”

Section: Example 1: Leu Enrichment Facility Misusementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Gaps in data to support NMA are described in Carchon et al (2011). To address these gaps, PM is being explored, for example, by monitoring load cells which probably cannot be bypassed during cylinder loading (Carchon et al, 2011).…”

Section: Example 1: Leu Enrichment Facility Misusementioning

confidence: 99%

“…For CEMO, MCNP is the main forward model in conjunction with measured gamma counts at various energies to infer whether HEU is present in the pipes. Carchon et al (2011) describe another role for forward modeling to address the inverse problem of whether the cascade hall is being improperly used as follows. Inspector access to the centrifuge cascade halls is extremely limited or denied.…”

Section: Example 1: Leu Enrichment Facility Misusementioning

confidence: 99%

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Integration of facility modeling capabilities for nuclear nonproliferation analysis

García¹,

Burr²,

Coles³

et al. 2012

Progress in Nuclear Energy

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Developing automated methods for data collection and analysis that can facilitate nuclear nonproliferation assessment is an important research area with significant consequences for the effective global deployment of nuclear energy. Facility modeling that can integrate and interpret observations collected from monitored facilities in order to ascertain their functional details will be a critical element of these methods. Although improvements are continually sought, existing facility modeling tools can characterize all aspects of reactor operations and the majority of nuclear fuel cycle processing steps, and include algorithms for data processing and interpretation. Assessing nonproliferation status is challenging because observations can come from many sources, including local and remote sensors that monitor facility operations, as well as open sources that provide specific business information about the monitored facilities, and can be of many different types. Although many current facility models are capable of analyzing large amounts of information, they have not been integrated in an analyst-friendly manner. This paper addresses some of these facility modeling capabilities and illustrates how they could be integrated and utilized for nonproliferation analysis. The inverse problem of inferring facility conditions based on collected observations is described, along with a proposed architecture and computer framework for utilizing facility modeling tools. After considering a representative sampling of key facility modeling capabilities, the proposed integration framework is illustrated with several examples. Highlights: We consider integration of facility modeling into a tool for proliferation analysis.  We describe the inverse problem of inferring the facility based on observables.  We propose architecture for integrating facility models into a suitable framework.  We illustrate the proposed integration framework with several examples.

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Section: Example 1: Leu Enrichment Facility Misusementioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Example 1: Leu Enrichment Facility Misusementioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Example 1: Leu Enrichment Facility Misusementioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Integration of facility modeling capabilities for nuclear nonproliferation analysis

García¹,

Burr²,

Coles³

et al. 2012

Progress in Nuclear Energy

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show abstract

“…The so-called next generation of safeguards technologies include flow monitoring [18,19], advanced enrichment monitoring [20][21][22], cylinder identification and tracking [23], feed and withdrawal process monitoring [24,25], on-site, near-real-time environmental sampling [26], and cylinder assay monitoring [27]. These technologies offer promise for enhancing verification procedures but most rely on cascade external parameters which an operator may be able to change with minimal chance of detection.…”

Section: Next Generation Safeguards Technologies and Approachesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Modeling and Simulation of Gas Centrifuge Cascades for Enhancing the Efficiency of IAEA Safeguards

Migliorini¹

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Since its inception in 1957, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has been tasked with ensuring the peaceful uses of nuclear facilities in nation-states that have ratified the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). To achieve this goal, the IAEA employs safeguards techniques to verify the declared use of facilities related to nuclear power. Recently, there has been an increasing interest and demand for nuclear power throughout the world while the budget of the IAEA has remained fairly stagnant. In Contents List of Figures vi List of Tables xiAcronyms xii

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Assessment of parameters of gas centrifuge and separation cascade basing on integral characteristics of separation plant

Borisevich

Borshchevskiy

Andronov

et al. 2013

Nuclear Engineering and Design

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Load cell monitoring in Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plants: Potentialities for improved safeguard verifications

Cited by 3 publications

References 1 publication

Integration of facility modeling capabilities for nuclear nonproliferation analysis

Integration of facility modeling capabilities for nuclear nonproliferation analysis

Modeling and Simulation of Gas Centrifuge Cascades for Enhancing the Efficiency of IAEA Safeguards

Assessment of parameters of gas centrifuge and separation cascade basing on integral characteristics of separation plant

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