Under general conditions, linear decision rules of agents with rational expectations are equivalent to restricted error corrections. However, empirical rejections of rational expectation restrictions are the rule, rather than the exception, in macroeconomics. Rejections often are conditioned on the assumption that agents aim to smooth only the levels of actions or are subject to geometric random delays. Generalizations of dynamic frictions on agent activities are suggested that yield closed-form, higher-order decision rules with improved statistical fits and infrequent rejections of rational expectations restrictions. Properties of these generalized "rational" error corrections are illustrated for producer pricing in maufacturing industries.
Keywords: Companion systems, error correction, producer pricing, rational expectations
JEL classifications: C5, E3I am indebted for comments on an earlier version of this paper by colleagues and others, especially F. Diebold, S. Johansen, and S. Kozicki. Views presented are those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of the Federal Reserve Board.
1Intertemporal decision rules are indispensable in rational agent interpretations of macroeconomic behavior where a distinction is drawn between agent perceptions, summarized by agent forecasts of market events, and agent responses, subjected to dynamic constraints or "frictions." In theoretical macroeconomic models since Lucas (1976), rational expectations have become the benchmark standard for representing the unobserved forecasts of agents.Unfortunately, the record for empirical implementation of rational expectations models remains dismal. A survey of existent journal publications by Ericsson and Irons (1995) summarizes an extensive accumulation of empirical evidence against rational expectations, including frequent rejections of rational expectations overidentifying restrictions. A review of policy simulation models used by central banks and international agencies, such as documented in Bryant et al. (1993), indicates that many key rational expectations specifications are either imposed or fit by rough empirical calibrations.Macroeconomists have adopted a variety of responses to the absence of strong empirical support for rational expectations. One is to maintain the rational expectations hypothesis, while aiming to interpret a more limited subset of empirical regularities as discussed by Kydland and Prescott (1991). Another approach is to view rational expectations as a limiting case of complete information in a more general treatment of the information processing abilities of agents, such as the "bounded rationality" models of learning reviewed in Sargent (1993). Closely related is the position that rational expectations are more likely to prevail at low frequencies, a view compatible with tests of long-run theoretical restrictions in cointegrating relationships, as discussed by Watson (1994). Others reject the hypothesis of model-based rational expectations, such as the use in Ericsson and Hendry (19...