Life and Mind: Varieties of Neo-Aristotelianism: Naive, Sophisticated, Hegelian

Abstract

In his treatment of subjective mind, Hegel argues that the development that characterizes the vital process of a human individual is logically unique in that it dissolves the contradiction between two logical determinations that characterize any vital activity: the contradiction between the ‘immediate singularity’ of the subject of this process and its ‘abstract generality’. Hegel employs the term Bildung to characterize any vital activity that has this form. The idea that the distinction between human life and non-human life is a logical distinction is one of the main lessons that Hegel thinks we should learn from Aristotle's treatment of the idea of life. In this article I distinguish between two contemporary varieties of this Aristotelian idea: a sophisticated variety that emphasizes the idea of second nature in order to characterize the distinctiveness of the human, and a naive variety that thinks of the human's uniqueness in terms of characterizations that already belong to its first nature. I argue that Hegel is neither sophisticated nor naive but offers a third variety of Neo-Aristotelianism that solves the difficulties of the other two. This has decisive consequences for his understanding of Bildung. Although the notion of Bildung describes an empirical process, Hegel argues, it is not an empirical concept. Rather, it is the concrete concept of the process of actualization that characterizes a self-conscious form of life that reflects the inner temporality of this form's actuality.

Hegel's Later Theory of Cognition: An Additive or Transformative Model?

“…I will refer to these texts in my analysis and will also note how they complicate the evidence provided by well-reasoned and explicitly ‘anti-transformative’ accounts such as the one advanced by Gobsch (2017). From a general point of view, my account is compatible with the particular kind of Hegelian Aristotelianism proposed by Kern (2020), from whom, as I will show, I draw some insights for my analysis of sensations.…”

“… 38 My view here is consistent with a central insight of Kern's account of Hegelian Aristotelianism (2020), namely the claim that ‘the idea of minded life, Hegel argues, is logically prior to the idea of animal life’, and therefore ‘none of the concepts that we employ to characterize animal life and its life process […] can be understood apart from the meaning that these concepts have in an articulation of the idea of minded life’ (Kern 2020: 49). In this sense, one could argue that the same kind of view also holds for the numerous forms of self-relation that Hegel explores in the Anthropology .…”

“…I will refer to these texts in my analysis and will also note how they complicate the evidence provided by well-reasoned and explicitly 'antitransformative' accounts such as the one advanced by Gobsch (2017). From a general point of view, my account is compatible with the particular kind of Hegelian Aristotelianism proposed by Kern (2020), from whom, as I will show, I draw some insights for my analysis of sensations. 7 To put it in Boyle's terms: 'We rational animals perceive and desire in the same sense in which any animal perceives and desires; the power that differentiates our minds is something separate and additional' (2016: 2).…”

Human Life, Rationality and Education

“…11In a companion paper on Hegel's account of the relationship between mind and life and the significance of the idea of education therein, I develop an account of the distinctiveness of Hegel's position by comparing it with the above two accounts (Kern, 2020). It is therefore interesting to note that both naïve and sophisticated varieties of Neo‐Aristotlianism think of themselves as articulating a broadly Hegelian picture.…”