Abstract:In this paper I explore the prospects of a Neo‐Aristotelian position—according to which the difference between the human species and non‐human animals is a difference in ‘form’—in the context of the question of how the human form of life is related to the idea of education. Two interpretations of this idea have been suggested by contemporary Neo‐Aristotelian philosophy that offer contrasting accounts of the role played by education. According to the first, the idea of a formal difference goes with a notion of … Show more
“…McDowell, as I did in The Formation of Reason (2011), and saying that we are born 'mere animals' who acquire powers of reason, we should maintain, with Rödl (2016) and Kern (2020), that human beings are rational animals-that is their first and only nature-but that they are dependent on others without whom their powers of reason cannot be actualised and cultivated. We are born into a world in which reason is externalised in so many forms-in the form and function of artefacts, in practices of communication, inquiry, reasoning, teaching, in the written word and other media, and in numerous forms of intelligent and creative activity-and our powers of reason find expression as we become at home in this world.…”
Section: Human Natural Historymentioning
confidence: 98%
“…The cogency of this position has been much debated and I will not rehearse those arguments here (see e.g. Bakhurst, 2011, 2012, 2015; Rödl, 2016; Kern, 2020; cf. Thompson, 2013).…”
What role should moral philosophy give to considerations about human nature and the character of human life? And what part should such considerations play in moral education? This paper explores these questions by contrasting the 'new intuitionist' position I defend in 'Practice, sensibility and moral education' (Bakhurst, 2018) with Philippa Foot's neo-Aristotelian naturalism, which holds that natural-historic description of the human life-form can furnish us with norms by reference to which failure to act morally can be understood as a kind of natural defect. Following John McDowell, I question whether a being that is rational, and therefore free, can allow such naturalhistorical description to decide norms of behaviour for it. Indeed, the new intuitionist should question whether naturalhistorical description, as Foot construes it, is even meaningful in the human case. For all that, however, I argue there is one natural-historical fact of momentous importance in understanding the human: that human beings become what they are through Bildung or education in the broadest sense. To develop this point, I turn to an unlikely ally, Immanuel Kant, who offers a robust account of Bildung designed to show how people acquire the Denkungsart (cast of mind) demanded by morality. Kant's view, I argue, presupposes knowledge of the human-as entering into both (i) the theoretical knowledge necessary to characterise the Denkungsart and the manner of its cultivation, and(ii) the practical knowledge involved in exercising it, for to be skilled at moral thinking requires understanding human life in its diversity, complexity and essential contestability. To offer
“…McDowell, as I did in The Formation of Reason (2011), and saying that we are born 'mere animals' who acquire powers of reason, we should maintain, with Rödl (2016) and Kern (2020), that human beings are rational animals-that is their first and only nature-but that they are dependent on others without whom their powers of reason cannot be actualised and cultivated. We are born into a world in which reason is externalised in so many forms-in the form and function of artefacts, in practices of communication, inquiry, reasoning, teaching, in the written word and other media, and in numerous forms of intelligent and creative activity-and our powers of reason find expression as we become at home in this world.…”
Section: Human Natural Historymentioning
confidence: 98%
“…The cogency of this position has been much debated and I will not rehearse those arguments here (see e.g. Bakhurst, 2011, 2012, 2015; Rödl, 2016; Kern, 2020; cf. Thompson, 2013).…”
What role should moral philosophy give to considerations about human nature and the character of human life? And what part should such considerations play in moral education? This paper explores these questions by contrasting the 'new intuitionist' position I defend in 'Practice, sensibility and moral education' (Bakhurst, 2018) with Philippa Foot's neo-Aristotelian naturalism, which holds that natural-historic description of the human life-form can furnish us with norms by reference to which failure to act morally can be understood as a kind of natural defect. Following John McDowell, I question whether a being that is rational, and therefore free, can allow such naturalhistorical description to decide norms of behaviour for it. Indeed, the new intuitionist should question whether naturalhistorical description, as Foot construes it, is even meaningful in the human case. For all that, however, I argue there is one natural-historical fact of momentous importance in understanding the human: that human beings become what they are through Bildung or education in the broadest sense. To develop this point, I turn to an unlikely ally, Immanuel Kant, who offers a robust account of Bildung designed to show how people acquire the Denkungsart (cast of mind) demanded by morality. Kant's view, I argue, presupposes knowledge of the human-as entering into both (i) the theoretical knowledge necessary to characterise the Denkungsart and the manner of its cultivation, and(ii) the practical knowledge involved in exercising it, for to be skilled at moral thinking requires understanding human life in its diversity, complexity and essential contestability. To offer
“…They are, in particular, related to environmental problems resulting from debilitating and environmentally unsafe economic activities. The human intervention in nature nowadays leads to complex consequences that will be felt for decades and even centuries (Kern, 2020). Scientists are alarmed by the growing degradation of the environment.…”
“…Andrea Kern writes: In the case of a self‐conscious form of life its concept is not that of an individual whose capacities have reached the stage of biological maturity, but the concept of an individual whose self‐consciousness has acquired a conceptual character, partly by being formed by another individual's self‐consciousness made manifest to her. (2020, p. 286)…”
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