Abstract. Safety cases have become popular, even mandated, in a number of jurisdictions that develop products that have to be safe. Prior to their use in software certification, safety cases were already in use in domains like aviation, military applications, and the nuclear industry. Argument based methodologies/approaches have recently become the cornerstone for structuring justification and evidence to support safety claims. We believe that the safety case methodology is useful for the software certification domain, but needs to be tailored, more clearly defined, and more appropriately structured in analogy with regulatory regimes in classical engineering disciplines. This paper presents a number of reasons as to why current approaches to safety cases do not satisfy essential attributes for an effective software certification process and proposes improvements based on lessons learned from other engineering disciplines. In particular, the safety case approach lacks the highly prescriptive and domain specific nature that can be seen in other engineering specialities, in terms of engineering and analysis methods to be applied in generating the relevant evidence. Safety case approaches and corresponding methods should aim to achieve the levels of precision and effectiveness of engineering methods underpinning regulatory regimes in other engineering disciplines.