Lessons from Payments for Ecosystem Services for REDD+ Benefit-Sharing Mechanisms

Loft, Lasse; Pham, T.T.; Luttrell, C.

doi:10.17528/cifor/004488

Cited by 4 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 48 publications

(71 reference statements)

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“…Tropical forest countries that engage in efforts to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from deforestation and forest degradation and participate in the international framework on REDD+ (reduced emissions from deforestation and forest degradation and the role of conservation of forest carbon stocks, the sustainable management of forests and the enhancement of forest carbon stock-together REDD+ or REDD-plus) must put in place policies and incentives to address drivers of deforestation while safeguarding the rights of indigenous peoples and vulnerable communities. They must decide on how to allocate financial and non-financial benefits from the implementation of REDD+ to various stakeholders and policies [1][2][3][4][5][6][7]. Claims to participate in REDD+ are often based on the concept of 'carbon rights', and clear and uncontested carbon rights are often a condition for donor funding.…”

Section: Introduction: Markets and Entitlement To Redd+ Benefitsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Who Owns REDD+? Carbon Markets, Carbon Rights and Entitlements to REDD+ Finance

Streck

2020

Forests

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The question of who is entitled to benefit from transactions under the United Nations framework to reduce emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD+) remains one of the most controversial issues surrounding cooperative efforts to reduce deforestation in developing countries. REDD+ has been conceived as an international framework to encourage voluntary efforts in developing countries to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and enhance carbon removals from forest activities. It was designed as an international framework under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) to enable the generation of emission reductions and removals (ERRs) at the national—and, provisionally, the subnational—level and is, thus, primarily a creature of international law. However, in defining forest carbon ERRs, the international framework competes with national emission trading systems and domestic REDD+ legislation as well as private standards that define units traded on the voluntary carbon market. As results-based and carbon market systems emerge, the question remains: Who can claim participation in REDD+ and voluntary carbon market projects? The existence of different international, national and private standards that value ERRs poses a challenge to countries that participate in REDD+ as well as to communities and private actors participating in voluntary carbon market projects. This paper seeks to clarify the nature and limitation of rights pertaining to REDD+ market transactions. It also links the notion of carbon rights to both carbon markets and government’s decision on benefit sharing. Applying a legal lens, this paper helps to understand the various claims and underlying rights to participate in REDD+ transactions and addresses ambiguities that can lead to conflict around REDD+ implementation. The definition of carbon rights and the legal nature of carbon credits depend on local law and differ between countries. However, by categorizing carbon rights, the paper summarizes several legal considerations that are relevant for regulating REDD+ and sharing the financial benefits of transacting ERRs.

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Section: Introduction: Markets and Entitlement To Redd+ Benefitsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Who Owns REDD+? Carbon Markets, Carbon Rights and Entitlements to REDD+ Finance

Streck

2020

Forests

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Lessons from the perceptions of equity and risks in payments for forest environmental services (PFES) fund distribution: A case study of Dien Bien and Son La provinces in Vietnam

Yang¹,

Pham²,

Dieu³

et al. 2015

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• There are currently five payment distribution models implemented in Dien Bien and Son La provinces under the national payment for forest environmental services (PFES) program for community forests: (1) equal distribution to all households within a community, (2) payment for forest protection groups, (3) building infrastructure, (4) community investments, and (5) livelihood development options e.g. microcredit schemes. Each of these models has pros and cons for achieving the 3Es outcomes of effectiveness, efficiency and equity. Current payment distribution models focus on the equality aspects and overlook the equity, efficiency and effectiveness of the program. Combining different payment distribution options can enhance the 3Es outcomes.• The main underlying factors that drive villagers' to decide on a payment distribution model are the local communities' perceptions on equity, the size of the PFES funds and their trust in local authorities' accountability and capacity.• There is a risk of PFES contractual obligations being breached given the absence and their associated of regular auditing and monitoring of financial transactions. A better monitoring system and auditing system is required to assess the chain of benefit distribution, from ecosystem service payments provided by the users (hydropower/water companies), the transactions mediated by the intermediaries (FPDF, commune government) and benefits received by the sellers (village committees/households). One option for those communities with access is to promote the use of banking systems to deliver funds from the province to the community. Alternatively, mobile banking systems could be an option in addition the government should aim to improve the capacity of people in the village to manage and record all of their financial transactions.• Local people have a limited understanding of how the PFES funds are distributed; they are unsure of their eligibility, the payment amount, the timing of payments and the conditions attached to the payment. Enhancing information dissemination, availability and transparency about payment conditionality and distribution is recommended to support both effective decision-making on resource use and PFES overall.

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