Theories" 12 This is not really surprising given that, according to Anderson "semantic representations are constructed out of predications that are locational or directional or non-locative non-directional" (Anderson 1973b: 10). 13 To be precise, Gruber distinguishes "causative agents" (John entered the sparrow into the cage) and "permissive agents" (John let the bird out of the cage) (Gruber's examples; 1965: 225f.). 14 This principle is abandoned in Fillmore (1969). For a discussion on the repetition of identical cases in a predication, cf. for example Starosta (1978). 15 It should be noted that in more recent texts Gruber has moved to the same position as Jackendoff : his roles are now specified with respect to argument positions of conceptual predicates (Gruber 1997a/b, Gruber 2001). Thanks to R. Boehm for having pointed this out to me.