Les limites de l'accumulation par les armes. Itinéraires d'ex-combattants au Tchad

Abstract

Si la guerre peut être une activité lucrative et si les possibilités de vivre des armes sont nombreuses au Tchad, seul un petit groupe d’hommes en armes ayant accès à l’État connaît des ascensions sociales fulgurantes. En analysant des itinéraires de (non)-accumulation d’ex-combattants, cet article montre que le monde des armes n’est ni un espace anarchique ni une voie d’ascension sociale ouverte à tous.

Leaving the PKK: Toward a process-oriented model of disengagement

“…With the war in Iraq and Syria, much research has been done on disengagement from Islamist groups, with this research coming to dominate the field (Chernov Hwang, 2015; Clubb, 2009, Cronin, 2006). 1 Case studies are rarer, limited mostly to right-wing fringe groups and gangs (Bjørgo and Horgan, 2009), disengagement from communist groups (Codaccioni, 2013; Cuadros, 2013), groups in Côte d’Ivoire (Montaz and Diallo, 2021), or other pathways for former combatants in postconflict contexts (Boutron, 2015, 2019; Calveiro, 2014; Debos, 2008; Duclos, 2010). Some studies have focused on emotions as a tool for analyzing exits from these groups (Larzillière et al, 2021).…”

Into the Heart of Central African Darkness

“…Ce qui les exclut aussi souvent de leur milieu social d'origine, et rend difficile tout retour à une vie « civile ». C'est ce que montre très bien Marielle Debos pour certains des ex-libérateurs Zaghawa de François Bozizé en 2003 (Debos, 2008). Ces ouvriers de la prédation sont parfois très jeunes, on les recrute justement pour cela, leur jeunesse et leur malléabilité.…”

The values of ‘anarchy’: moral autonomy among Tubu‐speakers in northern Chad

“…Practically all grown men and a few women have been in the army, a rebel group, or both at some point in their lives – more, probably, than have been at school. Images of success are bound up with armed violence rather than education, although a glorious career through military involvement remains an illusion for most (Debos : 167). This is so even though, since 1990, when the current president, Idriss Déby Itno, came to power in a coup d'état , there has been some stability.…”

“…This is so even though, since 1990, when the current president, Idriss Déby Itno, came to power in a coup d'état , there has been some stability. ‘For many years’, as Debos notes, ‘Chad has been neither at war nor at peace, but in an unstable situation with spells of relative calm and sudden eruptions of violence’ (2008: 170).…”