Abstract. Did Leibniz exploit infinitesimals and infinitiesà la rigueur, or only as shorthand for quantified propositions that refer to ordinary Archimedean magnitudes? Chapter 5 in (Ishiguro 1990) is a defense of the latter position, which she reformulates in terms of Russellian logical fictions. Ishiguro does not explain how to reconcile this interpretation with Leibniz's repeated assertions that infinitesimals violate the Archimedean property, viz., Euclid's Elements, V.4. We present textual evidence from Leibniz, as well as historical evidence from the early decades of the calculus, to undermine Ishiguro's interpretation. Leibniz frequently writes that his infinitesimals are useful fictions, and we agree; but we shall show that it is best not to understand them as logical fictions; instead, they are better understood as pure fictions.