Leibniz on Final Causation

Rozemond, Marleen

doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199542680.003.0008

Cited by 19 publications

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“…This interpretation is favored by a large number of Leibniz scholars, so we can call it ‘the standard interpretation.’ Another possibility is that unwelcome changes are instances of final causation only insofar as they are intended by God and serve a purpose in God's plan for the world. Donald Rutherford (‘Laws and Powers’ and ‘Leibniz on Spontaneity’) and Marleen Rozemond defend versions of this interpretive strategy. They hold that while some monadic changes are not explained by what the agent perceives to be good, these changes are nevertheless instances of final causation because of what God knows to be good.…”

Section: Three Ways Of Dealing With Problematic Casesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Leibniz on Causation – Part 2

Joráti

2015

Philosophy Compass

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Leibniz is almost unique among early modern philosophers in giving final causation a central place in his metaphysical system. All changes in created substances, according to Leibniz, have final causes, that is, occur for the sake of some end. There is, however, no consensus among commentators about the details of Leibniz's views on final causation. The least perfect types of changes that created substances undergo are especially puzzling because those changes seem radically different from paradigmatic instances of final causation. Building on my more general discussion of efficient and final causation in 'Leibniz on CausationPart 1,' I will examine and assess some of the rival interpretations of Leibniz's account of final causation.In 'Leibniz on Causation -Part 1,' I argued that the changes in created substances have both efficient and final causes, on Leibniz's view, and I explored various interpretations of how exactly Leibniz understands efficient causation. I also provided a rough sketch of the traditional Aristotelian account of final causation or teleology. In this tradition, the final cause is that for the sake of which a change occurs, or the purpose or end of some change. For instance, obtaining delicious coffee is the final cause of my trip to a coffee shop, and becoming a mature oak tree is the final cause of an acorn's developments. After all, I go to the coffee shop for the sake of the coffee, and the acorn changes for the sake of becoming an oak. In both cases, according to the tradition, this end or purpose is a vital component of the explanation. Now it is time to take a keener look at what precisely the final causes of the changes in Leibnizian substances might be.The interpretive difficulties and disputes surrounding Leibniz's views on efficient causation that I described in 'Leibniz on Causation -Part 1' are nothing in comparison to the difficulties and disputes surrounding his views about teleology. As noted in Part 1, Leibniz repeatedly describes the realm of monads as the kingdom of final causes (see e.g., M §79; G 7:344/AG 319). 1 He also associates appetitions with final causation, 2 and since appetitions govern all changes in monads, this presumably means that all monadic changes have final causes. Yet, he is less than forthcoming about the details of his understanding of the final cause. As a result, there are a number of different ways of interpreting Leibniz's doctrine that the changes in created monads have final causes. Final Causation in Deliberate ActionsLet us start with the least controversial cases, that is, the deliberate actions of rational agents. Take, for instance, the coffee shop example: I stand outside of my favorite coffee shop, think about what to do, and decide to go in and get a large caffè latte for myself. We can explain the consequent changes in my perceptions, such as my perceptions of walking into the coffee shop and of the transaction with the barrista, in terms of final causation. I have chosen to pursue a certain end -namely, enjoying some latte -and perfor...

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Section: Three Ways Of Dealing With Problematic Casesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Leibniz on Causation – Part 2

Joráti

2015

Philosophy Compass

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“…Second, she argues that my approach is "surprising," for it cannot be right given that it is so far out of line with the Aristotelian tradition. 29 I address each of these briefly, beginning with the second.…”

Section: The Non-aristotelian Novelty Of Leibniz's Teleologymentioning

confidence: 99%

The Non-Aristotelian Novelty of Leibniz’s Teleology

Carlin¹

2011

Leibniz Society Review

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My aim in this paper is to underscore the novelty of Leibniz's teleology from a historical perspective. I believe this perspective helps deliver a better understanding of the finer details of Leibniz's employment of final causes. I argue in this paper that Leibniz was taking a stance on three central teleological issues that derive from Aristotle, issues that seem to have occupied nearly every advocate of final causes from Aristotle to Leibniz. I discuss the three Aristotelian issues, and how major thinkers treated them in the medieval period. I argue that Leibniz rejected all of the mainstream Aristotelian teleological views on these issues. I conclude that Leibniz broke with longstanding threads of teleological thinking in ways that were often extreme.

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“…O'Neill (1993) highlights the lack of clarity in Leibniz's ascription of the label 'physical influx,' and concludes that we may hold him responsible for inventing the system that he then criticizes. That Suárez is among Leibniz's targets has been reasonably assumed in recent scholarship; e.g., Rozemond (2009), McDonough (2017. Tuttle (2016) all the causes that we experience; it can quickly be shown for every genus of cause' (DM 12.2.7).…”

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confidence: 92%

Efficient Cause as Paradigm? From Suárez to Clauberg

Hamid¹

2021

Journal of Modern Philosophy

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This paper critiques a narrative concerning causality in later scholasticism due to, among others, Des Chene (1996), Carraud (2002), Schmaltz (2008), Schmid (2010), and Pasnau (2011. On this account, internal developments in the scholastic tradition culminating in Suárez lead to the efficient cause being regarded as the paradigmatic kind of cause, anticipating a view explicitly held by the Cartesians. Focusing on Suárez and his scholastic reception, I defend the following claims: a) Suárez's definition of cause does not privilege efficient causation; b) Suárez's readers, from Timpler to Arriaga, did not interpret him as privileging efficient causation; c) it is only much later, in Clauberg, that we find a narrowing of the meaning of causation to efficient causal action; but d) this shift is better explained by Clauberg's rejection of substance hylomorphism in favor of Descartes's doctrine of substance, rather than by any troubles within the Aristotelian causal framework.

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Leibniz on Final Causation

Cited by 19 publications

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Leibniz on Causation – Part 2

Leibniz on Causation – Part 2

The Non-Aristotelian Novelty of Leibniz’s Teleology

Efficient Cause as Paradigm? From Suárez to Clauberg

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