Leibniz, Husserl, and the Brain

Sieroka, Norman

doi:10.1057/9781137454560

Cited by 7 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 113 publications

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“…For example, in terms of a supervenience relation between state space descriptions(Yoshimi 2011); in terms of topological invariants between conscious and unconscious processes(Sieroka 2015); or in terms of category theory(Tsuchiya et al 2016).…”

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confidence: 99%

Consciousness and topologically structured phenomenal spaces

Prentner

2019

Consciousness and Cognition

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There are strong reasons to believe that our conscious inner life is structured, suggested both by introspection as well as scientific psychology. One of the most salient structural characteristics of conscious experiences is known as unity of consciousness. In this contribution, we wish to demonstrate how features of experience that pertain to the unity of consciousness could be made precise in terms of mathematical relations that hold between phenomenal objects.Based on phenomenological considerations, we first outline three such features. These are (i) environmental embedding, (ii) the mutual constraint between local and global representations, and (iii) a top-down process of object formation in consciousness. We then introduce a formal model based on the notion of phenomenal space, defined in terms of a set of quasi-elementary and extended entities. We describe the structure of phenomenal space by appealing to mereological and topological concepts, and we outline a projector-based calculus to account for the idea that the structure of phenomenal space is ultimately dynamical.Using the above concepts, one could approach the mind-matter problem by relating environmentally embedded agents to the topologically well-defined objects that result from decompositions of phenomenal space. We conclude our discussion by putting it into the context of some recent theoretical questions that appear in cognitive science and consciousness studies. We opt for the possibility to regard the phenomenon of consciousness not in terms of a singular transition that happens between "brain" and "mind" but rather in terms of a series of transitions between structured layers of experience.

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confidence: 99%

Consciousness and topologically structured phenomenal spaces

Prentner

2019

Consciousness and Cognition

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“…4 Phenomenology and the neuroscience of consciousness A mathematized phenomenology promises to help make sense of certain puzzling features of consciousness, for example, the tensed-structure of experiences (Sieroka, 2015), epistemic asymmetry (Chalmers, 2010), the various unities of consciousness (Bayne, 2010) or the difference between states and levels of consciousness (Tsuchiya & Saigo, 2021), related to the phenomenological primitives reviewed in the previous section.…”

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confidence: 99%

Mathematized Phenomenology and the Science of Consciousness

Prentner

2024

Preprint

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In this contribution, we emphasize the relevance of mathematical approaches to the first-person perspective. We briefly discuss why this is necessary and why mathematics plays a special role when it comes to integrating scientific (empirical) and philosophical (theoretical) projects. We also sketch some potential ways that mathematics could be used in phenomenology, based on a selection of four ``phenomenological primitives'' that characterize constitution: intentionality, minimal subjectivity, lifeworld, and time consciousness. We also spell out a minimal topological toymodel and refer to some contemporary approaches using modern mathematics (e.g. category theory). We then discuss how this could be usefully applied to the (neuro)scientific study of consciousness and throughout stress the need to highlight (and formalize) phenomenology's transcendental character.

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“…(Husserl [1952(Husserl [ ] 1989 Henceforth I will speak of Husserlian neurophenomenology, not because he pursued this course in his writings, but because this is the natural development in the use of Husserl's findings in these post-neuro-turn 3 days in the humanities and social sciences (see Samson 2015; see also Craffert, Baker, and Winkelman 2019 for an anthropologically relevant example). Husserlian neurophenomenology (on my account) is simply the study of the neural correlates of essential structures of experience as discovered and described by Husserlian reduction methodology (see Sieroka 2015;Engelhardt 1977).…”

Section: H U S S E R L ' S M E T H O D S a N D N E U R O P H E N O M ...mentioning

confidence: 99%

Intersubjectivity, Empathy, Life‐World, and the Social Brain: The Relevance of Husserlian Neurophenomenology for the Anthropology of Consciousness

Laughlin

2022

Anthropol of Consciousness

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Our species of hominin, Homo sapiens, is an extremely social animal. We are born with social brains. The phenomenology of Edmund Husserl is a methodological approach to social consciousness that offers significant advantages in terms of uncovering and describing the essential structures of our social perceptions and actions. This is especially true in this period of post‐neuro‐turn social science, because the structures described by Husserlian “pure” phenomenology with its emphasis upon “returning to the things,” performing reductions, and developing the skills available to the phenomenological attitude are in synch with neuroscientific research on the neural correlates of consciousness. For the anthropology of consciousness, the Husserlian methodology allows us to explore consciousness in cross‐cultural settings in greater detail and depth of understanding. This is especially the case with respect to the experience of intersubjectivity, the roots of which are found to be part of the inherent life‐world that all normal humans depend upon to true their experiences of the environing world, regardless of cultural background. The Husserlian approach to intersubjectivity challenges the discipline of anthropology to move past its knee‐jerk distinction between nature and nurture, and its erroneous assumption that human experience is somehow “culture all the way down.”

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Leibniz, Husserl, and the Brain

Cited by 7 publications

References 113 publications

Consciousness and topologically structured phenomenal spaces

Consciousness and topologically structured phenomenal spaces

Mathematized Phenomenology and the Science of Consciousness

Intersubjectivity, Empathy, Life‐World, and the Social Brain: The Relevance of Husserlian Neurophenomenology for the Anthropology of Consciousness

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