Leibniz and the Natural World

Phemister, Pauline

doi:10.1007/1-4020-3401-6

Cited by 44 publications

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“…To take comprehensive stock of the main possibilities, we should consider Phemister’s (2005) lonely interpretive stand, which denies that Leibniz thinks monads, in the sense of unextended soul-like substances, exist at all (at least, as such). Where the idealist interpretation reduces corporeal substances to immaterial monads, Phemister argues that the true monads, when rightly understood, just are corporeal substances.…”

Section: Three Disharmonious Interpretationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…But there is no general agreement among Leibniz’s interpreters about when Leibniz is and is not being secretive. Rutherford and others dismiss the claims made about corporeal substances in the later sections of the Monadology on the grounds that the work was intended for the general public, while Phemister (2005), arguing for a Leibnizian commitment to corporeal substances, dismisses the first part of the same work on the grounds that it was written for a Cartesian audience. Each has apparently principled reasons, yet if we follow them both, we end up having to discount the entire work as an insincere subterfuge.…”

Section: Three Disharmonious Interpretationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…2Phemister (2005), 11. This position, attributed to Leibniz by Rutherford, Adams, Mates, Rescher, Garber and Wilson (the latter two ascribe it only to his late period) is sometimes referred to as “weak idealism” in contrast to the strong idealism of Berkeley.…”

Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Harmonizing Leibniz’s Ontology

Stumpf

2012

Dialogue

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I propose a novel compatibilist interpretation of Leibniz’s mature views concerning what is metaphysically basic. Drawing on a compatibilist reading of Aristotle on primary substance in the Categories and Metaphysics Z, I argue that Leibniz is working with two complementary ways of being metaphysically basic—one applying to immaterial monads, the other to corporeal substances. Although corporeal substances derive their status as basic from their dominant monads, they are nevertheless fully real, unified, and genuinely capable of acting. This perspective respects Leibniz’s idealist tendencies and his commitment to the reality of bodies without (implausibly) attributing inconsistency to his considered views.

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Section: Three Disharmonious Interpretationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Three Disharmonious Interpretationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Harmonizing Leibniz’s Ontology

Stumpf

2012

Dialogue

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“…Indeed, they must do if, as Leibniz held, the experiences had by the micro-constituents of our bodies mirror the component perceptions within our consciously experienced, but complex, pains and pleasures. 13 While few would admit to feelings of love towards such minute organisms, our modified definition of love as the taking of pleasure in the 'perfection, well-being and specific good' of the other, allows for the possibility of an unselfish love directed towards all living creatures, a love that is shown in the desire to promote their well-being in and of itself, a love that is not motivated by anthropocentric and utilitarian concerns, but which is motivated simply by the pleasure we gain from seeing other living creatures thrive. 14 Leibniz conceives justice in terms of love: 'Justice ... demands that we seek the good of others in itself, and since to seek the good of others in itself is to love them, it follows that love is of the nature of justice' (Elements of natural law: A VI i 465, L 137).…”

Section: Perceptions and Appetitionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Relational Space and Places of Value

Phemister

2011

Hist. Philos. Log. Anal.

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Drawing on a Leibnizian panpsychist ontology of living beings that have a body and a soul, this paper outlines a theory of space based on the perceptual and appetitive relations among these creatures’ souls. In parallel with physical space founded on relations among bodies subject to efficient causation, teleological space results from relations among souls subject to final causation and is described qualitatively in terms of creatures’ pleasure and pain, wellbeing and happiness. Particular places within this space include the kingdom of grace, where morally responsible, rational beings act as far as possible in accord with the ideal of justice as universal love and wise benevolence. However, while Leibniz considered love as properly directed only towards rational beings, it is argued here that the truly wise person will direct their love and benevolence towards all living things. Ausgehend von Leibniz’ panpsychistischer Ontologie von Lebewesen, die einen Körper und eine Seele haben, skizziert dieser Beitrag eine Theorie des Raumes, der auf den perzeptuellen und appetitiven Relationen zwischen den Seelen der Geschöpfe beruht. Parallel zum physikalischen Raum, der in Relationen zwischen den effizient kausal interagierenden Körper begründet liegt, ergibt sich aus den Relationen zwischen den Seelen, die finaler Verursachung unterliegen und in qualitativen Begriffen von Freude und Schmerz wie von Wohl und Zufriedenheit beschrieben werden, ein teleologischer Raum. Besondere Regionen dieses Raumes bilden das Königreich der Gnade, wo moralisch verantwortliche, rationale Wesen so weit wie möglich in Übereinstimmung mit dem Ideal der Gerechtigkeit als universale Liebe und weise Güte handeln. Während Leibniz jedoch meinte, dass sich echte Liebe nur auf rationale Wesen richte, wird hier argumentiert, dass eine wahrhaft weise Person ihre Liebe und Güte auf alle Lebewesen beziehen wird.

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“…Tal como ocorreu para a relação entre plenum e cadeia do ser, o significado dessa substancialidade primitiva também pode ser aprofundado tomando como referência inicial a exposição e a crítica quePhemister (2005) faz da interpretação idealistade Leibniz, proposta por Adams (1994). Nessa discussão aparece a distinção entre substância incompleta e completa que explora a relação das mônadas singulares, da substância corporal e do corpo orgânico.…”

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O conceito de mônada orgânica

Ramos

2012

Metatheo

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O objetivo principal do presente estudo é elaborar um conceito de mônada orgânica a partir de certos elementos da metafísica e da filosofia natural de Leibniz. Com tal elaboração, não pretendo propriamente oferecer uma nova interpretação da filosofia leibniziana, mas determinar um conceito que integre o que pode ser designado como modelo monadológico geral, cuja validade conceitual e histórica vai além dos marcos de tal filosofia. Começarei meu argumento sustentando que na metafísica da substância de Leibniz a pluralidade possui certa precedência em relação à simplicidade. Isso é feito articulando os conceitos de plenitude e de simplicidade substancial de modo a mostrar que dessa articulação emerge um conceito de plenum como agregado heterogêneo universal de corpos no qual a organicidade é mais fundamental do que a materialidade. Na segunda seção do artigo, procurarei conferir a esse plenum o estatuto metafísico de substância composta articulando-o a dois sentidos de vida, simples e composto. Os corpos substancialmente fundados exibem uma apetição característica da vida composta. A partir daí, passarei, na terceira seção, da substancialidade composta em geral para uma substancialidade orgânica específica através da determinação do conceito de organismo polar. Pretendo que tal conceito realize uma síntese dos aspectos fisiológicos e genéticos do organismo capaz de determinar, por fim, o conceito de mônada orgânica como resultante da associação entre uma metafísica que fundamenta a conservação dinâmica do orgânico e uma que fundamenta a pluralidade da transformação orgânica temporal.

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Leibniz and the Natural World

Cited by 44 publications

References 0 publications

Harmonizing Leibniz’s Ontology

Harmonizing Leibniz’s Ontology

Relational Space and Places of Value

O conceito de mônada orgânica

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