Legitimacy and Multi‐Level Governance in European Union Competition Law: A Deliberative Discursive Approach

Abstract

Union competition law protects 'consumer welfare', but what role do consumers play in competition policy-making? This is the question that this article seeks to answer. In the search for an answer, the article investigates the moral (output) and procedural (input) legitimacy of the recent competition law reforms. Following a discursive approach, the article looks into the roles played by institutions deliberating for citizens (consumer organizations, European Parliament and the Union Courts) in the reform process. This inquiry results in the questioning of the reforms' legitimacy, and it also leads to broader conclusions regarding the legitimacy of multi-level governance: expert discourses overshadow potential deliberative qualities of networks, which exacerbates networks' legitimacy problems. Also, the input/output legitimacy dichotomy appears problematic, as expert policy-making in the absence of citizen participation does not guarantee policies resonating with public interest.

Filling the gap in the European administrative space: the role of administrative networks in EU implementation and enforcement

“…Furthermore, accountability problems loom large (Bignami 2005;Cengiz 2016;Papadopoulos 2007;Smismans 2008).The selective composition and informality of many EAN privileges certain interests at the expense of others (Eberlein and Grande 2005: 106;Papadopoulos 2007;Smismans 2008). Their weak visibility insulates them from public scrutiny.…”

“…At the same time, EANs raise a set of normative issues, related to the fact that EANs are mostly made up of civil servants and experts from the national and European administrations (Cengiz 2016). Mandating such administrative actors implies processes of depoliticization, devolving power towards the administration and blurring the lines of political responsibility (Bach et al 2015;Blauberger and Rittberger 2015: 374).…”